


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
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DATA BASE ANALYSIS FOR
PERCEPTIONS OF EMERGENCY PROGRAMS

Final Report

For:

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Washington, D.C. 20472

FEMA Award Number EMW-83-C-1232
FEMA Work Unit Number 4841B

February, 1984

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By:

Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc.

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Block 19 (continued)

6. Considerations for FEMA

Block 20 (continued)

6. Considerations for FEMA

The Federal Emergency Management
Agency
OF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
BACKGROUND AND STUDY PURPOSE.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	5
PLANNING TO RESPOND TO NUCLEAR INCIDENTS.....	9
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.....	25
OTHER MAN-MADE DISASTERS.....	33
CLIMATE FOR EMERGENCY BEHAVIOR.....	43
INFORMATION/CREDIBILITY ISSUES.....	53
CONSIDERATIONS FOR FEMA.....	65
APPENDIX	

BACKGROUND AND STUDY PURPOSE

BACKGROUND AND STUDY PURPOSE

This document presents the findings of a program conducted for the Federal Emergency Management Agency by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc. In this effort, the firm drew upon its ongoing proprietary and public research, data and analysis to:

...Identify the major social, economic and political trends that appear to influence the mission of FEMA and the kinds of communications, regulatory or programmatic approaches suitable for achieving agency objectives.

...Assist FEMA in fashioning these findings into actionable recommendations for modifications in agency policies and programs.

Data collected by YSW through ongoing survey research between 1970 and 1983 were analyzed by the firm's professionals assigned to this project to provide insight to FEMA on a number of public policy and social values issues. Relevant issues were identified by FEMA personnel. Joint discussions between YSW and FEMA personnel were then held to determine the availability of the information from the data bases.

These data bases derive from in-depth, personal interviews among distinct sample populations being asked different lines of inquiry. Respondents from one sample population were surveyed on social values and their impact on behavior.

Over 2,500 interviews have been conducted each year to provide the social values trend data base. Respondents in this sample were surveyed for over an hour and are representative of the general population of the United States, aged 16 years and older. A subgroup of this sample is representative of all college students in the country.

Distinct samples were questioned with other survey instruments to collect information relating to a wide range of public policy issues.

Nearly 3,000 interviews have been conducted annually among the general population of individuals representative of the United States population, 16 years of age and older including a subsample of college students living on campus (distinct from the sample queried on social values issues).^{1/} In addition, approximately 500 leaders--including elected and appointed government officials, interest group leaders, news/media executives, business community leaders and union officials--are interviewed annually.^{2/}

Interviews with the general public and college samples were carried out by members of the YSW Consumer Field Staff, a field

1/ In light of shifts in the public policy climate, in 1983 the general public sample interviewed on these issues was redesigned. For maximum cost effectiveness, data collection for the public policy general public sample is now incorporated with that of the social values population.

2/ In 1983, the leadership sample was limited to almost 260 individuals considered to be experts in their respective areas.

force of 2,100 men and women throughout the country, trained and supervised by YSW central office personnel.

Leadership interviews were conducted by the YSW Senior Council. This staff is a specially prepared interviewing corps comprised primarily of retired business and government executives. Senior Council members are particularly adept at gaining access to these difficult-to-reach leaders as well as at eliciting the in-depth, probing information which requires high levels of judgment and knowledge.

As appropriate, we drew upon other public and proprietary data collected by the firm on issues relevant to those being considered by FEMA. Examples of this are our data base used by Time Magazine and other work related to emergency planning and evacuation.

This report amplifies the information imparted at the presentation and serves as the document described in contract number EMW-83-C-1232.

A note on organization. Supporting tables follow discussion on each topic. A case history report, "A Negotiated Investment Strategy: A Joint Agreement on Principles, Allocations and Plans for the Social Services Block Grant" comprises the Appendix.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In order to better understand where the social and public policy climate of the nation is going in the mid-1980's, it is important to take a look back on the recent history of social change in this country.

...The 1940's-1950's were characterized by an economic agenda on the part of the public. Their goal was upward mobility--a need which probably became more salient given many people's exposure in this affluent postwar period to new things and the possibility, for the first time, of attaining them. For the individual, the Protestant Ethic emphasizing self-denial, the routine delay of current desires for the future, rigid moral standards and hard work was the means to the goal of upward mobility. On the public policy level, the government contributed to economic growth via the implementation of various programs--e.g., through highway expansion programs, inexpensive mortgages, education loans. All these factors resulted in economic success for the country. By the end of the 1950's, 70% of the population was considered middle class, the highest in history, and the United States was the undisputed leader of the free world.

...A sense of optimism led to the assumption of continued economic growth; in other words, that America's economic

pie would expand forever. Interestingly, as more and more people assumed affluence, they grew to believe that they were entitled to affluence--a phenomenon we have entitled the "psychology of entitlement." It then became easy for them to de-emphasize the material well-being they assumed they would continue to enjoy. In terms of the public's agenda, they began a search for a goal "better" than that of upward mobility, while at the same time sharing their good fortune with the remaining 30%. Consequently, their focus shifted to social issues. On a personal level, the search for self-fulfillment became paramount. The traditional means to achieving success, the Protestant Ethic, began to weaken insofar as the individual was concerned. Self-sacrifice and the willingness to delay gratification and strict morality were replaced with a focus-on-self mentality, an emphasis on the "here and now" and looser morals.

...Nevertheless, the Protestant Ethic did not disappear. Instead, the stringent morality of the Ethic was turned away from the individual toward society as a whole. On this level, America's new social agenda was characterized by a "fix it" mentality--e.g., in the areas social injustice, the effects of industrialization on the environment. Furthermore, government was given prime responsibility to correct society's ills; it funded, implemented and regulated most programs.

...As we moved into the late 1970's-early 1980's America awoke to the "realities" facing her. On the economic level, problems such as recession, inflation, a weaker global position seemed intractable. On the personal level, the goal of self-fulfillment proved elusive to many and the penalties of extreme forms of the focus-on-self posture--e.g., divorce, personal isolation--were realized. As a society we began to question our ability to "fix everything."

...Looking toward the remainder of the decade, several themes are emerging.

- A tempering of traditional American optimism.
Up through the end of the 1970's we believed we could do everything and have everything. There is now the recognition that total solutions may not be possible. Furthermore, we can expect a reduction in expectations; in other words, "a limited pie" in the future.
- Emphasis on cost effectiveness. As we have seen, in the 1940's-1950's the major criterion for judgment was growth. In the 1960's and 1970's morality became a more salient variable. In the 1980's, as an outgrowth of the pragmatic view that not all things are possible, a cost/benefit approach will gain preeminence.

- A rise in competitive, strategic behavior.

Today's public sees the "can't have it all" reality and will be taking a more competitive approach to the "limited pie." More specifically, we expect a movement away from assumed entitlements to earned benefits. In addition, we expect less emphasis on the "here and now" and more on planning for the future.

- A growing local parochialism. As discussed

earlier, the focus-on-self mentality of the 1960's-1970's has tempered in recent years as people began to feel its negative effects--loss of community, loss of commitment to and from family and friends, and personal isolation.

There is now a hunger for community; competition among regions/local areas is on the rise. In the public policy domain, there has been a shifting of arenas from the federal level to more decentralized units.

- Increasing commitment to merit, excellence.

Americans are rejecting the notion of quick fixes. They are now demanding competence of themselves and of their institutions, such as business and government. The concept of broad entitlements is being replaced by the demand to demonstrate excellence.

PLANNING TO RESPOND TO NUCLEAR INCIDENTS

PLANNING TO RESPOND TO NUCLEAR INCIDENTS

An analysis of the social and public policy climate regarding FEMA preparation for nuclear incidents reveals that this topic encompasses two subissues: public concern about nuclear war/weapons and the climate for nuclear energy. At present, the "top-of-mind" connection between these two issues resides mainly at the activist level. For the mainstream, the link is probably more tenuous, with specific incidents in one arena--e.g., the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear power plant and the closing of the Clinch River breeder reactor--vaguely raising anxieties about the nuclear issue as a whole. However, given the vanguard nature of activists and the possibility of further nuclear incidents even greater anxiety re the nuclear issue is possible long term.

Concern About Nuclear War

The possibility of nuclear war is a salient issue for the general public. According to YSW data, over the last three years a majority of the general public (50%-60%) consistently "worries a lot" about a nuclear war occurring.

CONCERN ABOUT NUCLEAR WARThe Possibility of
a Nuclear War

	<u>Worry</u>	<u>Do Not</u>	
	<u>a Lot</u>	<u>a Little</u>	<u>Worry</u>
	%	%	%
January, 1980	69	21	9
March, 1980	53	30	17
May, 1980	59	28	13
September, 1980	50	31	19
October, 1980	62	26	12
June, 1983	52	29	19
September, 1983	60	27	13

Climate for Nuclear Energy

...Overall, the climate for nuclear energy is mixed. While concern remains high, and by many indications is growing, Americans are not yet willing to foreclose on the nuclear option. More specifically, a more negative climate is indicated by:

- Increased concern about a nuclear power plant accident. Currently, 4 out of 10 people "worry a lot" about such an accident occurring; a similar number felt this way immediately following the Three Mile Island incident in 1979.
- Growing rejection of the notion of building more nuclear power plants as a solution to the energy problem given possible health hazards from radiation.
- An increase in the number of people who would vote "no" to a referendum to put a nuclear power plant near their homes.
- Growing demand among the general public for new regulation on nuclear safety given a more anti-regulatory climate.

On the other hand, interest in nuclear power as a solution to the energy problem still exists among a minority of the public and a minority of government leaders.

- A stable 3 out of 10 people continue to look toward nuclear plants as a short-term source of energy, while an even greater number anticipate a role for nuclear plants more long term (into the next century). Apparently, the public hopes for improvements in technology to mitigate nuclear hazards.

...Although there are a number of specific concerns about nuclear energy cited by sizable minorities of the public, the issue of waste disposal is most prominent: three-quarters of the general public is worried about radioactive power plant wastes and half of government officials view transportation of wastes as the most important short-term problem for the nuclear industry. Interestingly, the waste disposal issue has grown somewhat in importance among the general public at the same time that it has tempered among government officials.

...The fear of nuclear power plant sabotage and theft of nuclear materials are less salient issues expressed by 4 out of 10 and one-third of the public, respectively. In the recent past, concern about these issues has been stable.

...Management of decommissioned plants is seen as a growing problem by the public and by government officials in particular. More than half (54%) of government officials currently believe that management of decommissioned plants is the most important long-term problem for the nuclear industry compared with only 36% in 1980.

...In comparison with other issues, government leaders are relatively unconcerned about emergency preparedness re nuclear power plant incidents: only 3 out of 10 government leaders saw this issue as the most important short-term concern for the nuclear industry in 1982 compared with more than half at the beginning of the decade.

...Regarding the issues of federal versus state control: contrary to the general trend favoring a shift of power from the federal level to more local units, there is strong preference for federal over state regulation of plants among the general public. This inconsistency is indicative of the public's high level of concern re nuclear power, as does their preference for local control over siting.

PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT

	General Public			
	April, 1979	August, 1979	June, 1983	September, 1983
	%	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Worry a lot	42	29	38	38
Worry a little	30	33	40	42
Do not worry at all	28	38	22	20

Question: "People all have different concerns about what's going on in the world these days, but you can't worry about everything all the time. Will you tell me for each of the following whether right now this is something that worries you personally a lot, a little, or not at all?"

ATTITUDES RE IMPORTANT CAUSES OF THE
NATION'S ENERGY PROBLEM

	<u>General Public</u>			
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%	%
Delays in approving construction of energy facilities such as nuclear power plants	29	26	26	18

Question: "All of the following have been cited as possible causes of the energy problem. Which of these, if any, do you think are the most important causes of America's current energy problem?"

ENVIRONMENT TRADE-OFFS FOR ENERGY

Solution: Build more nuclear power plants.

Sacrifice: Possible health hazards from radiation.

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
Acceptance	18	15	10
Rejection	50	59	63

Question: "There are certain solutions to the energy problem that present environmental risks. Here is a list of solutions and their risks. Again, please tell me whether you are strongly in favor, mildly in favor, mildly against or strongly against each one--keeping in mind the solution as well as the risk."

LOCAL REFERENDUM ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>Referendum to Put Nuclear Power Plant Within 50 Miles of Community If Community Badly Needs Electricity</u>			
Would vote yes	49	46	43
Would vote no	41	42	48
Not stated	10	12	9

Question: "Let's suppose that your community was badly in need of a new source of electricity and that the community was experiencing brownouts, occasional blackouts, and higher and higher electric rates because of this situation. The local utility company has decided that the cheapest and most efficient plant to build would be a nuclear power plant that would be located within 50 miles of town. Let's suppose that a referendum was held in your community on whether or not to build this plant. How would you vote? Would you vote yes to build the plant or no, not to build it?"

AREAS WHERE NEW REGULATION IS NEEDED

<u>Nuclear Safety</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
General public	45	46	55
Government officials	44	53	44

Question: "In which of these areas, if any, do you think we need new regulation of business at either the federal or state/local level?"

TECHNOLOGIES WHICH WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE
IN SOLVING THE ENERGY PROBLEM

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%	%
<u>Short Term</u>				
<u>General Public</u>				
More nuclear plants	28	33	29	29
Breeder reactors	11	10	10	12
<u>Government Officials</u>				
More nuclear plants	38	36	26	NA
breeder reactors	8	5	-	NA
<u>Long Term</u>				
<u>General Public</u>				
More nuclear plants	33	40	42	37
Breeder reactors	15	19	28	26

NA = Not available.

Question: "By the year 1990, which of these technologies will play a major role in solving our energy problem?"

"Now thinking about the long term, into the next century, which of these technologies, if any, do you think will play a major role in solving our energy problems?"

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUS
THE NEED FOR ENERGY

	General Public		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

In View of Our Need for
Energy, How Have We Done in
Protecting the Environment
and Insuring Public Safety?

Nuclear Power Safety

Not gone far enough	72	68	64
Gone far enough	13	18	20
Gone too far	5	7	8

Question: "For each of the following, please tell me whether you think we have gone too far, far enough, or not far enough in protecting the environment and insuring public safety in view of our need for energy."

CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
Problem of radioactive waste disposal	69	76	74
Contamination of water	61	61	59
Possibility of small seepage causing health hazards	62	60	63
Possibility of massive seepage causing death	58	58	57
Danger to workers	50	53	49
Possibility of atomic explosion	47	45	47
Danger of seepage from earthquakes	41	45	50
Possibility of sabotage	44	42	42
Theft of nuclear materials	37	36	35
Problem of what to do with plants that are no longer in use	34	34	41
None of these	8	4	5

Question: "Some people say that we will be using more and more nuclear power plants to generate electricity, but this seems to worry some people. Which of the following, if any, worry you about nuclear power plants?"

IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FOR THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

	Government Officials		
	1980	1981	1982
	%	%	%
<u>Short Term</u>			
Transportation of wastes	49	67	49
Emergency preparedness	56	39	(28)
Management of decommissioned plants	11	23	10
<u>Long Term</u>			
Transportation of wastes	43	42	38
Emergency preparedness	25	31	(16)
Management of decommissioned plants	36	56	54

Question: "We'd like to get your opinion on both the short-term and long-term problems facing the nuclear power industry. This card lists some problems associated with nuclear power plants. Which, if any, of these do you see as the most important problems for nuclear power in the short term? Long term?"

PREFERRED LEVEL OF REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY

	General Public					
	Federal Government		Regional Authorities		Individual States	
	1982	1983	1982	1983	1982	1983
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Rules for operating nuclear power plants	65	62	11	11	18	23
Transportation of hazardous substances	56	50	13	13	26	31
Disposal of hazardous wastes	43	40	16	18	33	37
Choosing the location for nuclear power plants	25	33	22	19	46	41

Question: "We have heard three points of view about what level of government should have responsibility for regulations to protect the environment and consumers. I'm going to read you several regulatory areas. For each one, please tell me whether you feel responsibility for regulation should rest with the individual states, regional governing authorities, or the federal government."

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Exposure to hazardous substances is the number one safety concern among the public and government officials. The primacy of the hazardous waste issue is indicated by a variety of measures. When presented with a number of potential problem areas, hazardous waste was the topic most frequently cited as requiring more pressure by activists among the general public. In addition, it was the area most often mentioned as being the "most important issue for the 1980's" by government officials and as requiring new regulation by the public and government leaders. It is important to keep in mind that within these contexts, "hazardous waste" is broadly defined by respondents and may encompass the nuclear waste issue touched upon earlier as well as other types of hazardous substances.

Industry is viewed as the primary villain among the public with regard to hazardous wastes: 6 out of 10 cite industry as the major obstacle to preventing further progress on hazardous waste cleanup and control. Consistent with the public's negative view of industry vis-a-vis hazardous materials, a similar 6 out of 10 believe that business has shown poor compliance with current laws or guidelines--a sentiment which has grown since last year. In contrast government leaders have a more favorable view of industry. They are most likely to blame the cost of hazardous waste cleanup and the public's unwillingness to permit disposal in

their communities. Interestingly, both the general public and government officials are consistent in the level of blame (4 out of 10) they attribute to government with regard to further progress in this area.

The saliency of the hazardous waste issue is certainly reflected by the call for new and stricter regulation by strong majorities of both the general public and government officials. Similarly, preference for local over federal regulation by three-quarters of the public is indicative of the great deal of attention to this problem.

CONCERN ABOUT HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Need More Activism Re:</u>			
Disposal of hazardous wastes	82	81	80
Transportation of hazardous substances	75	76	73
 <u>Government Officials</u>			
	<u>1982</u>		
	% <u>Important Issues for 1980's</u>		
Hazardous waste management	76		

Question: "The last decade has seen a great deal of activist pressure for regulation in such areas as consumerism, protection of the environment, privacy protection, etc. Some leaders feel that while much has been accomplished, still more vigorous activity is needed in at least some areas. Others feel that activists in many areas have essentially alerted us to problems and we are now well along in solving them. For each of the areas I mention, please tell me if you think this is an area where continued strong activist pressure is needed."

"Here is a list of issues and trends that affect business. Looking ahead, which, if any, of these do you feel will be very important in the 1980's?"

OBSTACLES TO HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL

	General Public		Government Officials	
	1982	1983	1982	1983
Lack of cooperation from the chemical industry	50	63	30	46
Lack of cooperation from industries which create wastes as part of the manufacturing process	67	61	48	58
High cost/lack of funds	45	47	62	65
Lack of government commitment/enforcement	47	46	45	44
Uncertainty as to which materials have harmful effects	38	42	42	39
Public unwillingness to permit disposal of waste in their community	48	40	68	62
Lack of adequate technology	40	35	65	53
Compared to other national problems, hazardous waste is not a priority	21	14	8	5
None of these	1	3	-	-
Not stated	5	1	-	-

Question: "Which, if any, of these items, do you perceive as major obstacles preventing further progress with regard to hazardous waste cleanup and control?"

BUSINESS COMPLIANCE WITH CURRENT LAWS
AND GUIDELINES ON HAZARDOUS WASTES

		<u>General Public</u>	
		<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
		%	%
<u>Total</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Business Has Complied:			
<u>Total favorable</u>		<u>49</u>	<u>32</u>
Very well		4	3
Fairly well		45	29
<u>Total unfavorable</u>		<u>47</u>	<u>62</u>
Rather poorly		36	41
Very poorly		11	21
Not stated		4	6

Question: "As you know, laws have been passed and government guidelines have been set up in order to ease the problem of hazardous wastes. In your opinion, how well has American business, in general, observed these laws and guidelines--would you say":

AREAS WHERE NEW REGULATION NEEDED

	General Public			Government Officials		
	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Disposal of hazardous wastes	52	58	69	59	74	73
Transportation of hazardous substances	42	48	54	56	68	55

Question: "In which of these areas, if any, do you think we need new regulations of business at either the federal or state/local level?"

ENFORCEMENT OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE REGULATIONS

		General Public	
		1982	1983
		%	%
<u>Total</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Question: "In Your
Opinion, Should
Hazardous Waste
Regulations Be":

Stricter	63	74
About as strict	31	22
Less strict	2	1

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL REGULATION

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>A law which sets regulations for the transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes within the community which are stricter than the standards set by the federal government</u>			
Favor	69	71	75
Oppose	19	21	23
Undecided	2	8	2

Question: "Here is a list of some possible areas in which local communities might pass regulations. For each one, please tell me whether you would favor or oppose such a law in your own community, keeping in mind the possible trade-offs involved."

OTHER MAN-MADE DISASTERS

OTHER MAN-MADE DISASTERS

Despite the public's recognition that they "can't have it all" and a new emphasis on cost effectiveness, commitment to the environment remains strong. Health/safety concerns, in contrast with environmental aesthetics (i.e., the appearance of the environment), have become more salient as the importance of the latter has waned.

Interestingly, while the public voices strong interest in protecting water resources in particular, as evidenced by a dramatic increase in a call for new regulation in the area, concern about pollution from oil appears to be tempering.

...There is a more favorable view among the general public of offshore oil well compliance with water pollution laws and guidelines.

...And the more prevalent view among the public and government officials that we have done enough in protecting the environment and insuring public safety from oil spills and offshore drilling.

Liquid natural gas is receiving little attention by the public or government leaders as playing a major role in solving the energy problem in the short term or the long term: Interest in LNG as a

possible short- or long-term solution to the energy problem is only at the 2 out of 10 level among the general public and government leaders in comparison to a 7 to 8 out of 10 level of interest in a "popular" technology such as solar energy.

Concern about environmental safety threats from LNG storage is at a moderate and stable 4 out of 10 level among the general public, while the transportation issue is growing somewhat in importance among this population.

Government officials, on the other hand, are increasingly satisfied with protection against LNG hazards. The belief that we have done enough in protecting the environment and insuring public safety from potential LNG storage problems has increased from around half of government officials in 1980 to 8 out of 10 officials in 1982; regarding potential LNG transportation problems, this view has increased from approximately half to two-thirds during the same time period.

AREAS WHERE NEW REGULATION NEEDED

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Water Pollution</u>			
General public	34	34	61
Government officials	23	27	27

Question: "In which of these areas, if any, do you think we need new regulation of business at either the federal or state/local level?"

INDUSTRIES DOING POOR JOB COMPLYING
WITH WATER POLLUTION LAWS
AND GUIDELINES

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
Oil tankers	46	50	48
Offshore oil wells	41	38	(35)

Question: "Which industries, if any, do you feel have done a poor job of observing the laws and guidelines on water pollution?"

TECHNOLOGIES WHICH WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE
IN SOLVING THE ENERGY PROBLEM.

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%	%
<u>Liquid Natural Gas</u>				
<u>Short Term</u>				
General public	21	20	17	22
<u>Long Term</u>				
General public	16	19	21	17
Government officials	19	19	15	NA

NA = Not available.

Question: "By the year 1990, which of these technologies will play a major role in solving our energy problem?"

"Now thinking about the long term into the next century, which of these technologies, if any, do you think will play a major role in solving our energy problems?"

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUS
THE NEED FOR ENERGY

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>
<u>In View of Our Need for Energy, How Have We Done in Protecting the Environment and Insuring Public Safety?</u>			
<u>Oil Spills From Supertankers</u>			
Not gone far enough	71	65	60
Gone far enough	12	21	28
Gone too far	6	5	5
<u>Offshore Drilling</u>			
Not gone far enough	44	41	37
Gone far enough	32	40	44
Gone too far	10	6	7
<u>Liquid Natural Gas Storage</u>			
Not gone far enough	38	35	38
Gone far enough	29	36	35
Gone too far	2	3	5

* Does not add to 100% due to unsure respondents.

Continued...

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUSTHE NEED FOR ENERGY
(Continued)

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>
In View of Our Need for Energy, How Have We Done in Protecting the Environment and Insuring Public Safety? (Cont'd.)			
<u>Liquid natural Gas Transportation</u>			
Not gone far enough	31	33	36
Gone far enough	32	37	40
Gone too far	6	5	6
<u>Underground Mine Safety</u>			
Not gone far enough	60	66	46
Gone far enough	22	22	34
Gone too far	3	2	3
<u>Natural Gas Pipeline</u>			
Not gone far enough	41	40	34
Gone far enough	38	41	46
Gone too far	6	4	7

* Does not add to 100% due to unsure respondents.

Question: "For each of the following, please tell me whether you think we have gone too far, far enough, or not far enough in protecting the environment and insuring public safety in view of our need for energy."

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUS
THE NEED FOR ENERGY

	Government Officials		
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>
<u>In View of Our Need for Energy, How Have We Done in Protecting the Environment and Insuring Public Safety?</u>			
<u>Oil Spills From Supertankers</u>			
Not gone far enough	62	50	39
Gone far enough	30	42	49
Gone too far	-	3	3
<u>Offshore Drilling</u>			
Not gone far enough	30	28	21
Gone far enough	52	60	66
Gone too far	10	3	10
<u>Liquid Natural Gas Storage</u>			
Not gone far enough	41	31	13
Gone far enough	44	53	75
Gone too far	3	2	3

* Does not add to 100% due to unsure respondents.

Continued...

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY VERSUSTHE NEED FOR ENERGY
(Continued)

	<u>Government Officials</u>		
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>	<u>100*</u>
In View of Our Need for Energy, How Have We Done in Protecting the Environment and Insuring Public Safety? (Cont'd.)	.	.	.
<u>Liquid Natural Gas Transportation</u>			
Not gone far enough	38	44	23
Gone far enough	52	42	62
Gone too far	2	8	3
<u>Underground Mine Safety</u>			
Not gone far enough	32	36	34
Gone far enough	54	49	54
Gone too far	5	6	5
<u>Natural Gas Pipeline</u>			
Not gone far enough	19	19	36
Gone far enough	62	64	48
Gone too far	10	11	10

* Does not add to 100% due to unsure respondents.

Question: "For each of the following, please tell me whether you think we have gone too far, far enough, or not far enough in protecting the environment and insuring public safety in view of our need for energy."

CLIMATE FOR EMERGENCY BEHAVIOR

CLIMATE FOR EMERGENCY BEHAVIOR

A number of social climate developments suggest a more favorable climate for individuals to consider the "societal good" as opposed to their own self-interest.

...A primary factor in this regard is the general trend of less "meism" that we have discussed. To recap, the 1960's saw the weakening of the Protestant Ethic emphasis on self-sacrifice and self-denial. In its place, emerged a system of values which had a focus-on-self orientation. In other words, this period was characterized by far more emphasis on the individual at the expense of larger institutions--e.g., the family, the company, the nation. However, recent data suggest a tempering of this focus-on-self orientation. People began to recognize the penalties of such an approach and to yearn for some of the benefits of a less self-centered life-style--e.g., family and community experiences.

This important social climate development suggests a greater overall inclination to be involved with others. Some research conducted outside of the firm corroborates this idea: a Gallup poll conducted in March, 1981 indicated that the nearly half (47%) of adult Americans exhibited a structured pattern of

volunteerism in that year.^{1/} In addition to willingness to donate their time, Americans are more willing to make financial donations: individual philanthropy grew 9.2% in 1982 compared with a 3.9% rate of inflation.^{2/}

...Related to the phenomenon of less "meism" is a general trend we have detected of greater attention to the external environment. The focus-on-self orientation of the 1960's-1970's was characterized by a tendency among many to introspect, or focus inward. This new tendency to look outward means that people will be more concerned about meeting objective standards and being more concerned about doing the "correct" thing. However, this development does not mean a return to traditional notions of self-sacrifice or rigid conformity to "appropriate" behavior. There is ongoing tolerance for diverse, less "traditional" life-styles. Furthermore, while the public's expectation of receiving broad entitlements (e.g., from government, business) has lessened, in the area of hazardous substances where concern is high, demands for corporate social responsibility remain high. For example, three-quarters of the general public favor a law

1/ Volunteer work was broadly defined as "working in some way to help others for no monetary pay."

2/ Source: 1983 Annual Report of the American Association of Fund-Raising Council.

requiring involved companies to contribute to a fund to compensate local residents endangered by toxic substances.

...An additional factor relevant to the climate for emergency behavior is the public's orientation to time and planning. As you will recall, the 1960's-1970's was characterized by a focus on the "here and now." An important factor in recent shifts in social values is a renewed concern about the future. Once again, we do not see a return to rigid concern about the future and planning that characterized the 1950's; rather, there is a greater recognition of the benefits of planning--particularly in today's more competitive environment.

BELIEF THAT NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL MORE
IMPORTANT THAN FAMILY AS UNIT

	<u>General Public</u>				Net Change 1971- 1983
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	
	%	%	%	%	
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>%a/</u>
Strong	3	4	3	4	
Moderate	34	38	41	37	(+5)
Weak	63	58	56	59	

a/ "Net change" represents the algebraic sum of changes over time in strong support level (+ for an increase; - for a decrease) and weak support level (+ for a decrease; - for an increase).

Note: Based on a series of scaled items reflecting:
(1) the belief that the family unit and its needs and activities should be "placed ahead of everything else"; (2) the assessment of the proportion of satisfaction that is derived from the family in relation to away-from-home activities of all types, including jobs, friends, community activities, organizations, etc.; (3) the empathy felt with the idea that "there should be less emphasis on family togetherness," since this idea runs counter to a focus on the individual person as an entity.

ATTITUDES TOWARD CHILDBEARING

(Among women)

<u>General Public</u>			
<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
%	%	%	%

Agree That:

"Having a child is an
experience every woman
should have"

54 60 63 **64**

DESIRE FOR MORE COMMUNITY SOCIAL CONTACT

	General Public				Net Change 1973- 1983
	1973	1981	1982	1983	
	%	%	%	%	a/
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	
Strong	32	49	44	47	
Moderate	59	48	54	51	(+22)
Weak	9	3	2	2	

a/ "Net change" represents the algebraic sum of changes over time in strong support level (+ for an increase; - for a decrease) and weak support level (+ for a decrease; - for an increase).

Note: Based on a series of scaled items reflecting: (1) desire for more contact with people in the local community; (2) the need to know more people with similar social values; and (3) inclination to know what one shares in common with neighbors and co-workers.

EXTENT OF BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP
FILL GOVERNMENT FISCAL GAPS

	<u>Government Officials</u>			
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

As Government Services
 Are Cut Back Because of
 the Growing Movement to
 Lower Taxes, Business
 Has a:

Broad responsibility to fill gaps	19	37	42	34
Narrow responsibility to fill gaps	56	41	49	54
No responsibility	23	17	5	11
Not sure	2	5	4	1

Question: "As you know, as a result of a growing movement to lower taxes and keep government budgets under control, many state and local governments are cutting back on services, particularly social services. Some people say that large local business corporations should step in and fill the gaps left by shrinking government budgets; others say that business should certainly try to ease the pain but should use its funds more directly for business purposes. Do you think large business corporations have a broad responsibility, a more narrow responsibility, or no responsibility to help out as government budgets shrink?"

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL REGULATION

General
Public

1983

%

Total 100

A law which would require that all companies in a community which produce or dispose of hazardous substances contribute money to a fund to compensate local residents whose health or property might be endangered by toxic substances discovered near where they live

Favor	75
Oppose	18
Undecided	7

Question: "Here is a list of some possible areas in which local communities might pass regulations. For each one, please tell me whether you would favor or oppose such a law in your own community, keeping in mind the possible trade-offs involved."

"LIVE FOR TODAY" ORIENTATION

	<u>General Public</u>				<u>Net Change 1979-1983</u>
	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	
	%	%	%	%	% ^{a/}
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	
Strong	16	15	16	12	
Moderate	73	66	63	65	(-16)
Weak	11	19	21	23	

a/ "Net change" represents the algebraic sum of changes over time in strong support level (+ for an increase; - for a decrease) and weak support level (+ for a decrease; - for an increase).

Note: Based on a series of scaled items including: (1) belief that one should focus on optimizing one's life "today" and "let the future take care of itself"; (2) acceptance of the principle that at least some portion of current earnings should be put aside against the future even if it means being deprived of something one "thinks is needed now"; (3) the choice of a future-oriented versus a present-oriented course of action in the spending of an unexpected windfall, e.g., banking or investing the money versus using it for a vacation or for the purchase of a luxury; (4) extent of commitment to planning ahead; (5) belief in the idea that the future of one's children is more important than one's own current well-being.

INFORMATION/CREDIBILITY ISSUES

INFORMATION/CREDIBILITY ISSUES

As a consequence of the trend of greater attention to the external environment, today's public has a stronger perceived need for objective information. Consistent with this development, and of renewed appreciation of objective standards, we are finding less automatic rejection of traditional authority figures.

Data collected by the firm indicate that overall the media, scientists and environmentalists are credible sources of information, with 4 to 5 out of 10 of the general public believing what they say. Government agency officials in contrast have relatively little credibility in the public's eye: only 15% report this source as believable. Regarding the environment, the results are quite predictable--environment and local citizen groups are most trusted. More than half of the general public reports that they always/usually believe what these sources say about environmental issues. News media and state/federal regulatory agencies are believable to a lesser extent: their credibility level stands at the 3 out of 10 level.

In work the firm has done related to emergency planning and evacuation on Long Island, New York, civil defense and state health officials proved to be most credible re nuclear power issues. However, despite the relatively high standing of these

sources, only half of the residents in the potentially affected area consider them highly believable. This suggests a credibility gap in cases of nuclear emergency.

The new status of women in today's society is noteworthy regarding the issue of credible information sources. Women have become more salient decision makers, in part, as a result of their entrance into the labor force and of their growing levels of education and professional achievement. In addition, greater acceptance of interchangeable sex roles, both attitudinally and behaviorally, is evident. As such, we would expect an enhanced role for women regarding family emergency plans as well as increased stature as information sources.

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION SOURCES

	<u>General Public</u>		
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
	%	%	%
<u>Always/Usually Believe</u>			
TV news	59	54	53
Scientists	53	48	53
Small businessmen	49	50	50
Newspapers	48	51	50
Judges			47
Environmentalists	39	45	41
Ralph Nader	37	40	39
Consumer advocates	32	34	34
Public opinion polls	34	36	33
Government agency			
officials	14	18	15
Union leaders	16	15	15
Public issue ads	9	10	14
Congressional leaders	13	12	13
Corporate executives	10	12	12

Question: "Every day we all hear different points of view from different people and different institutions. We are interested in knowing how often you believe what different people say. Please tell me how often you believe what each of them says."

CREDIBILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATIONGeneral Public

	1983		
	<u>Always/ Usually Believe</u>	<u>Sometimes Believe</u>	<u>Seldom/ Never Believe</u>
	%	%	%
Environmental groups	53	32	14
Local citizens groups	53	36	10
News media	33	44	23
State regulatory agencies	31	45	23
Federal regulatory agencies	27	45	27
State legislators	25	49	26
Congressional leaders	18	47	34
Local companies and industries	17	44	39
Large American corporations	13	38	48

Question: "Everyone has different points of view about environmental issues. We're interested in knowing how often you believe what different people say. For each of the people on this card, please tell me how often you believe what they say about environmental issues."

CONFIDENCE IN THOSE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

	General Public		
	1983		
	Very/ Somewhat Confident	Very Confident	Somewhat Confident
	%	%	%
Environmental groups	74	34	40
Local citizens such as you and your neighbors	72	21	51
Regulatory agencies in your state	60	8	52
The American public, as a whole	54	14	40
Federal regulatory agencies (such as the Environmental Protection Agency)	54	11	43
Your state legislature	53	9	44
Your governor	52	9	43
Congress	52	8	43
Local companies and industries in your area	48	7	41
The President	46	12	34
Large American corporations	32	4	26

Question: "Here is a list of various institutions which all, in some way, have responsibilities for protecting the environment. For each institution, please tell me how confident you are that the institution will protect the environment. Please use the scale at the top of the card, and read me the letter of the item and the number on the scale."

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION SOURCES
REGARDING NUCLEAR POWER

North-
eastern
General
Public

1983

%

Percentage Who Would Rate as
Highly Believable Statements
About Nuclear Power Issues by:

Civil defense	51
State health officials	51
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission	44
The police	41
The governor	32
TV and radio reporters	30
The Suffolk County Executive	23
LILCO	23

Question: "Rated '5' or '6' on a 6-point scale where 1 equals completely unbelievable and 6 equals completely believable."

SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S OUT-OF-THE-HOUSE ACTIVITIES

	<u>General Public</u>				<u>Net Change 1971- 1983</u>
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	
	%	%	%	%	<u>%^{a/}</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	
Strong	27	51	49	51	
Moderate	52	40	44	42	(+38)
Weak	21	9	8	7	

a/ "Net change" represents the algebraic sum of changes over time in strong support level (+ for an increase; - for a decrease (and weak support level (+ for a decrease; - for an increased)).

Note: Based on a series of scaled items including:
 (1) the point of view taken toward homemaking, ranging from "interesting and challenging" to "dreadfully dull" and unrewarding; (2) the belief that married women with children should not work unless the money is absolutely necessary, or, at most, should only work part time; (3) the belief that any woman, even one who is married with children, "should be given the opportunity to have a career" if she wants one, and can "work out ways of handling her home and family while pursuing a career"; (4) the point of view taken with respect to women's suitability to perform in top level jobs for which they are well trained--ranging from the feeling that, irrespective of qualifications, women are not suited for "responsible, top level jobs," to the conviction that, with equal qualifications, women can perform as well as men.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
	%	%	%	%
Women 16 years and older	37.7	50.9	51.5	52.1

Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Earnings monthly as reported in the
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 103
Edition, 1982-1983, Table 626, p. 377.

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

(Among women 25 years or more)

	<u>1970</u> ^{a/}	<u>1979</u> ^{b/}	<u>1980</u> ^{b/}	<u>1981</u> ^{b/}
	%	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Elementary school	27	18	18	18
Some high school	18	15	15	14
High school graduate	37	40	40	41
Some college	10	14	14	14
College graduate or higher	8	13	13	13

a/ Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 356, Educational Attainment in the United States: March, 1979 and 1978, Table 1, p. 8.

b/ Statistical Abstract of the United States, 103 Edition, 1982-1983, Table 226, p. 143.

PROFESSIONAL ATTAINMENT

(Among women)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
	%	%	%	%
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>White collar workers</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>66</u>
Professional/technical	15	16	17	17
Managers and administrators	4	6	7	7
Salesworkers	7	7	7	7
Clerical workers	34	35	35	35
 Blue collar workers	 16	 15	 14	 14
Service workers	22	20	19	19
Farm workers	2	1	1	1

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States,
 103 Edition, 1982-1983, Table 648, p. 386.

ACCEPTANCE OF INTERCHANGEABLE SEX ROLES

	General Public				
	1971	1980	1981	1982	1983
	%	%	%	%	%
<u>Either/Both Sex(es) Have the Responsibility</u>					
<u>Domestic Activities</u>					
Shopping for groceries	63	76	77	75	77
Doing the daily cooking	23	49	51	51	54
Cleaning the house	50	73	76	77	76
Taking care of small children	33	56	55	60	60
<u>Financial Responsibilities</u>					
Deciding the family financial philosophy--how much to save, spend, etc.	92	93	94	90	93
Deciding how much should be spent on major purchases	89	92	92	91	93
Having life insurance	76	85	86	84	86
Earning a living	70	84	84	83	86

Question: "Traditionally, men are expected to be responsible for making a living and providing for their families, and women are expected to take care of the children and the home. Some people agree with this traditional division of effort, others do not. For each item on this card, please tell me whether you feel it should be done only by men, only by women, either by men or by women, or whether it should be done by both men and women."

REACTION TO WORKING WIVES

(Among men with working wives)

<u>Agree That:</u>	<u>General Public</u>			
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
	%	%	%	%
"I would be happier if my wife didn't work and devoted more time to homemaking"	24	25	14	18

Question: "Many husbands with working wives have told us that there are certain things that bother them about having their wives work. Everything considered, would you be happier if your wife did not work and devoted more of her time to homemaking?"

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FEMA

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FEMA

Several relevant issues emerge from analysis of the YSW data bases which are worthy of reemphasis.

The American public and its leaders remain concerned about public health and safety, in spite of the diminished call for government regulation and oversight of many areas affecting our lives today.

In particular, concern about nuclear power plants--especially with respect to the disposal and transportation of wastes--and exposure to hazardous substances top the list.

In the late 1960's and 1970's one of the manifestations of the changing American social values was a focus-on-self mentality and the desire for more "ad hoc" life-styles. These attitudes have begun to change. We find now a more positive climate for pro-social behavior during emergencies, including an increasingly positive stance towards planning. This portends a more favorable attitude towards the activities of agencies such as FEMA.

We are also witnessing a greater willingness to assume responsibility in our interviews with the American people. The combination of recognizing recent economic realities, the push for cost effectiveness, growing local parochialism and an increased commitment to merit and excellence have all contributed to this phenomenon.

An artifact of this development is a growing demand from the public for useful, actionable information, which also has implications for the activities of agencies like FEMA.

During its heyday, the 1960's and 1970's, government was looked to as the funder, implementer and regulator of programs. We believe that these roles, while appropriate at the time, are no longer possible or advisable. Rather, we suggest for FEMA a facilitator's role--in view of the current budgetary constraints, the negative attitudes toward government in general and the expressed desire for other sectors to take prime responsibility for accomplishing certain national public policy goals.

We envision several potential forms of that role.

a. Provider of Objectivity

We believe that government is in a position to oversee and provide more objective research and information than is currently the case. The problem is not simply insufficient information--often there is much more information than required. Rather, the public's need is linked to the aforementioned demand for objective information. Agencies like FEMA are capable of meeting that requisite.

b. Convener

Another essential function is that of convener. Certain solutions/situations may require input from a number of

resources. Data indicate the public's receptivity to public/private partnerships and sound leadership. The opportunity exists for FEMA to take fuller advantage of these public desires.

c. Communicator

A logical corollary to the collection of objective information is the dissemination and communication of that information. FEMA has an opportunity to utilize various existing technologies--be it cable television, computers, improved printing/graphic capabilities, etc.--to reach more people, more effectively. This approach will be coincident with the public's demand for information and cost effectiveness.

d. Clarifier/Negotiator

As has been stated, the problem is not so much a lack of information or resources. Rather, the public and, at times, local/state/regional leaders are often confused about what is right or wrong, who is responsible in certain circumstances and what is needed/available to cope with those situations. A need exists for some entity to assume the leadership for clarification and/or negotiation. FEMA clearly can assume this role.

A successful example of how this worked is found in Connecticut's Response to the New Federalism: The


Social Services Block Grant and Negotiated Investment
Strategy (see Appendix).

In this case, the State of Connecticut adapted the Negotiated Investment Strategy developed by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation to reach an agreement among all affected parties on how to allocate social services block grant monies. This process involved direct negotiations among teams representing various levels of government and other involved parties, was supervised by a mediator and resulted in a written agreement.

While recognizing that the above illustration is but one approach which might be used, we are suggesting that approaches like this can be utilized by FEMA to settle differences, reach agreements and solve problems.

APPENDIX

The State of Connecticut



A NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY

A JOINT AGREEMENT ON
PRINCIPLES, PRIORITIES, ALLOCATIONS AND PLANS
FOR THE SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT

October 1, 1983 - September 30, 1984

Prepared by teams representing the Executive Branch of the
State of Connecticut, Connecticut Municipal Governments, and
Connecticut Non-Profit Social Service Providers.

CASE HISTORY

Connecticut's Response to the New Federalism:
The Social Services Block Grant and The
Negotiated Investment Strategy

A History

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Preface

This history recounting Connecticut's Negotiated Investment Strategy experience was written principally by John F. Bantell. However, the author would like to acknowledge the assistance of a number of persons without whose help it could not have been written. First, I would like to thank Benson Cohn and Robert Grant of the Office of Policy and Management, who provided the author with an overview of the NIS process and a "feel" for the "behind the scenes" activities. I would also like to thank Christine Carlson of the Kettering Foundation for her thoughtful comments regarding conceptual and organizational problems with the first draft. Finally, I would like to thank Joseph Stulberg, the NIS Mediator, for sharing his insights into both the style and substance of the actual negotiations.

Table of Contents

	Page
Preface	i
I. Change and Response: Title XX and The Social Services Block Grant	1
A. Introduction	1
B. Title XX: The Connecticut Experience	1
C. The New Federalism and the Social Services Block Grant	2
D. The Governor's Block Grant Task Force	3
E. The Charles F. Kettering Foundation	4
II. Designing The Connecticut NIS	4
A. Early OPM/Kettering Discussions	4
B. Early State Agency Involvement in the NIS Design	6
C. OPM and Kettering: A More Formal Relationship	8
D. Goal and Objectives	9
E. Refining the NIS Design for Connecticut	10
III. Organizing For Negotiations	12
A. In Search of a Private, Non-Profit Team	12
B. Formation of the State Team	14
C. Formation of the Municipal Team	15
D. The Mediator Selection Process	15
E. Funding Arrangements	16
F. Pre-Negotiation Orientation and Preparations	17
G. Agreement on Rules of Procedure	18
H. Establishing Initial Team Positions	19
1. The State Agencies	19
2. The Private, Non-Profits	20
3. The Municipalities	21
I. Data Base Development	21

IV.	The Bargaining Process	22
A.	The Formal Negotiations Begin: The First Public Joint Session	22
B.	Horizontal Negotiations: Intra-Team Meetings/Negotiations	24
C.	The Second Joint Session: Laying the Groundwork for Priority Setting	25
D.	The Third Joint Session: Service Priorities Continued	26
E.	The Fourth Joint Session: Allocating SSBG Funds	31
F.	Final Agreement: The Fifth Joint Session	35
V.	Assessing the Process	37
A.	Post-NIS Activities	37
B.	Conclusion	39
Appendix I	Table of Team Meetings and Events	40
Appendix II	Priorities and Allocations	42

I. CHANGE AND RESPONSE: TITLE XX AND THE SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT

A. Introduction

In July 1981 Congress passed a bill merging a number of categorical programs into block grants and drastically reducing funds available to states for support of a wide variety of social and health services. This bill, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, reversed an era of increasing federal fiscal involvement in and control over state and locally run social and health services. This "New Federalism" initiative, with its greater flexibility but reduced funding, virtually mandated increased emphasis on careful planning and priority setting by states. Although opposed to the funding cuts, Connecticut responded to this new and difficult environment not by retrenching and stubbornly clinging to the status quo, but with creativity and innovation.

A major element in Connecticut's innovative response to block grants and the "New Federalism" has been the implementation of an experimental negotiated approach to the allocation of the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). The negotiated approach utilized in Connecticut was an adaptation of the Negotiated Investment Strategy (NIS) developed by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation to facilitate urban policy implementation. In essence, the concept involves a negotiated agreement among multiple teams regarding complex intergovernmental policies. The NIS involves direct negotiations among teams representing the various levels of government and other affected parties and is supervised by a mediator. The negotiations result in a written agreement. In Connecticut's NIS the Office of Policy and Management (OPM) was designated by the Governor to serve as coordinator of block grant implementation and, accordingly, played a leading role in organizing the negotiations.

B. Title XX: The Connecticut Experience

In December 1974 Congress enacted Title XX of the Social Security Act as Public Law 93-647. Title XX in part replaced Title IV-A (Social Services to Families) and Title VI (Social Services to Adults), and was intended to provide greater public participation in the design of state social service plans, as well as to allow states more flexibility in the use of federal funds. Title XX was a reimbursement program which offered payments to states for social services prior expenditures up to their share of the national ceiling. In 1974 Congress set the Title XX program ceiling at \$2.5 billion. By Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1982 this ceiling had risen to \$3 billion, with Connecticut's share pegged at \$41,943,204 for social services and approximately \$6 million for training programs.

Title XX established five national goals which eligible services would have to help achieve. These goals were:

- o Achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce or eliminate dependency;

- o Achieving or maintaining self-sufficiency, including reduction or prevention of dependency;
- o Preventing or remedying neglect, abuse or exploitation of children and adults unable to protect their own interest; or preserving, rehabilitating or reuniting families;
- o Preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care by providing for community-based care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive care;
- o Securing referral or admission for institutional care when other forms of care are not appropriate, or providing services to individuals in institutions.

Connecticut developed a group of nineteen services which could be funded through Title XX. These included:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| o Adoption | o Information & Referral |
| o Community-Based | o Legal |
| Institutional Substitute | o Safeguarding/Protective |
| o Counseling, Guidance | o Recreation & Social Development |
| and Appraisal | o Residential Treatment |
| o Child Day Care | o Employment Service |
| o Adult Day Care | o Shelter Assistance |
| o Day Treatment | o Special Ed. Training/Support |
| o Family Planning | o Transportation |
| o Foster Care | o Community Care for Elderly and |
| o Home Management- | Disabled |
| Maintenance | |

Historically, Connecticut has distributed Title XX funds in three ways: to state social services agencies, which in turn utilize them directly and for contracted services; to private, non-profit agencies through direct contracts; and as a form of revenue sharing with municipalities for social services. A single state agency, the Department of Human Resources, has been responsible for administering the Title XX program since 1979. Its responsibilities include collection of eligible billings through a grants and contracts process, monitoring and evaluation, planning, promotion, public participation and preparing appropriate reports on expenditures.

C. The New Federalism and the Social Services Block Grant

In August 1981 Congress amended Title XX of the Social Security Act and converted it into the Social Services Block Grant. Initially, President Reagan proposed merging a number of additional federal social service programs with Title XX, including Foster Care and Child Welfare Training grants, to create one large social services block grant. However, Congress refused to go along with this recommendation. The final version of the Social Services Block Grant contained only those programs which had previously been funded through Title XX, including social services, child day care and training. Funding, however, was reduced from an expected \$42 million in 1982 to about \$32 million, although a

number of restrictions on use of the funds, including certain client eligibility restrictions, were eliminated. Additionally, Title XX funds were no longer considered a reimbursement but were to be an entitlement.

In combination these changes presented the state with a number of fiscal and political problems.

D. The Governor's Block Grant Task Force and The Negotiated Investment Strategy

Governor William O'Neill responded to the challenges posed by the "New Federalism" by forming an inter-agency task force to recommend procedures for administering the shift to block grants and coping with the reduced funding levels. After several months of study the Block Grant Task Force recommended that a negotiated process be used to augment the standard budget process where block grants involved more than one or two state agencies. The new Social Services Block Grant was identified as most appropriate for a test of the negotiated approach to budgeting and priority-setting. The Task Force identified several advantages to using the new approach:

- o It provides an open, participatory process leading to an agreed upon outcome.
- o It subjects each agency to a critical review by its peers and enhances the possibility of broad, cross-agency priority setting.
- o It can help decrease duplication of services while increasing intergovernmental and interagency communication.
- o It can help integrate federal funds and priorities with State funds and priorities.
- o It can promote public confidence through an open, innovative approach that directly involves the service providers.

However, as Connecticut was required to assume responsibility for the SSBG on October 1, 1981, only about six weeks after enactment, there was no time for careful program evaluation and priority-setting. Conducting negotiations during this first year of the SSBG was impossible. Time consuming start-up arrangements, combined with the fact that the state and federal budget cycles are not coordinated, also prevented negotiations during the second year of the SSBG. Accordingly, the negotiation process described here deals with the allocation of SSBG funds for the third year of the SSBG program (FFY 1984), although only one and a half years actually elapsed between the inception of the block grant and the completion of negotiations.

The Task Force's recommendation was due largely to the familiarity of several of its members with an innovative negotiation technique developed by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation of Dayton, Ohio to facilitate resolution of complex intergovernmental problems. Initially, this technique, the Negotiated Investment Strategy (NIS), was designed to deal with urban-specific problems, especially those which

grew out of the direct relationship between the federal government and municipalities that had developed during the 1960's and 70's.

The NIS concept involves direct negotiation among multiple teams regarding investment decisions (funding) and regulatory actions by various levels of government and the private sector to serve the needs of a particular city. As developed by Kettering, the process includes supervision of the negotiations by an impartial mediator/facilitator and results in a written agreement. The Foundation's NIS experiments in St. Paul, Minnesota, Columbus, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana have dealt successfully with a wide array of complex issues involving a large number of interested agencies and parties at all levels of government.

Although the NIS was developed to deal with urban policy problems in individual cities, both the Task Force and the Kettering Foundation believed that the techniques developed in other NIS experiments were applicable to a wider range of intra- and intergovernmental issues. Kettering's own thinking paralleled Connecticut's interest in utilizing the NIS for management and resolution of problems posed by the new Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). In early communications between Kettering and OPM the Foundation explicitly recognized that implementation of the SSBG was a potentially suitable application of the NIS and it was receptive when approached for assistance in designing and implementing a negotiated allocation of the Social Services Block Grant.

E. The Charles F. Kettering Foundation

The Charles F. Kettering Foundation is a non-profit, research-oriented organization. Founded in 1927, the Foundation conducts research on a wide range of subjects including science, technology, education, international affairs and government. The Foundation generally does not award grants, but rather contracts for services to carry out its program agenda. It also provides technical support to other organizations and agencies working in areas where it has expertise and interest.

II. DESIGNING THE CONNECTICUT NIS

A. Early OPM/Kettering Foundation Discussions

Late in 1981, the Office of Policy and Management, the Governor's planning and budget arm, initiated a series of talks with Kettering Foundation staff regarding the feasibility of adapting NIS to block grant management. The Kettering Foundation's technical support, should an NIS be mounted in Connecticut, was also discussed. These initial contacts indicated enthusiasm for the project by both parties. Accordingly, OPM staff prepared a series of questions designed to serve as bases for discussion regarding adaptation of the NIS to Connecticut's needs. These questions dealt generally with the following concerns:

- o Ground rules for the negotiations. Who writes them? When? OPM's role?
- o How does OPM carry out its responsibilities to protect/represent the Governor's interests?

- o Should criteria for judging merits of different services be developed prior to negotiations?
 - o How many negotiating teams should there be?
 - o What is the appropriate role for municipalities and other SSBG recipients? How should their interests be represented in the negotiations?
 - o Is an active or passive mediator role most appropriate?
 - o What is a suitable division of labor between the mediator and OPM?
- Additionally, OPM requested the Kettering Foundation's advice on the following procedural steps:
- o Where and how can a suitable mediator be recruited and paid for?
 - o How much pre-negotiation training should be provided and where can such training be obtained?
 - o How can negotiations be kept on schedule?
 - o What fall-back procedures should be used if the negotiations fail to reach a timely conclusion?
 - o Should social service programs or functions be considered in the negotiations?
 - o What formal arrangements, if any, should there be for monitoring the process?
 - o What outside organizations, if any, should be invited to observe the process?

Ambitiously, OPM also proposed a tentative NIS schedule which projected a final agreement by August 30, 1982. This proposed schedule ultimately proved optimistic by almost four months.

The first meeting between OPM and Kettering Foundation staffs to discuss a possible SSBG/NIS occurred on November 19, 1981. Discussion revolved around the Foundation's response to the questions raised by OPM. During this first meeting a number of areas of agreement concerning the design of an NIS for Connecticut's SSBG emerged. Among these were:

- o . With regard to ground rules, the parties to the negotiations must concur that any agreement must be binding on the parties. Accordingly, no individual or organization with the ability to contravene the agreement should be outside the negotiations. This meant that:
 - o The Governor would have to commit his administration to accept the outcome of the negotiations. (The Kettering Foundation

made this a condition of its own participation in Connecticut's NIS.)

- o The General Assembly had to be brought meaningfully into the process.
- o OPM would represent the Governor's interests in the negotiations by participating as a negotiating party.
- o With regard to defining the participants, it was agreed that the main concern was to involve all appropriate and necessary parties. Participation of the private, non-profit sector was a special concern.
- o With regard to the structure of the negotiations, there were two concerns:
 - o As the subject of the negotiations was complex, issues should be divided into manageable and coherent sections or steps.
 - o Negotiations should occur within teams and then between teams.

Both staffs agreed that a number of preparatory steps would have to be taken prior to the actual negotiations, including:

- o Building the capacity of the negotiating parties to negotiate (training).
- o Accumulating and sharing basic data.
- o Selecting a mediator.
- o Securing funds for a mediator.
- o Negotiating the ground rules.

B. Early State Agency Involvement in the NIS Design

Following the 19 November meeting OPM reconvened the Subcommittee of the Governor's Interagency Task Force on Block Grants to elicit additional advice regarding NIS design. This Subcommittee was madeup of deputy commissioners from several state human service agencies. Issues addressed and conclusions reached during this Task Force Subcommittee meeting included:

1. General Assembly involvement. Options:
 - a. Briefings only.
 - b. Invite key members to observe negotiations.
 - c. Include key chairpersons as participants (recognizing that their views would not be legally binding on the General Assembly).

- d. Push legislation outlining legislative involvement and binding the General Assembly to the outcome of the negotiations.

The Subcommittee recommended pursuing a combination of options a and b.

2. Municipal and private agency representation. Options:

- a. Invite these two sectors to select and accredit their own teams.
- b. Call together elements from each and help them select teams.
- c. Hold tiered negotiations (see below)
- d. Limit the participation of these sectors to determining the proportion of funds each sector received and the objectives and priorities within each share.

The Subcommittee concluded that option b was essential and that OPM should take the lead in this effort.

3. Scope and objectives of the negotiations. Options:

- a. Zero based budgeting.
- b. Focus on particular strategies, such as "most bang for the buck" or deinstitutionalization.
- c. Focus on the potential of the negotiations to set priorities for a broader range of programs.

The Subcommittee recommended that "the objective of the negotiations, at least the first time, should be limited to allocation of the Social Services Block Grant funding." However, it was recognized that even with such a limitation, broad policies would have to be agreed upon, priorities would have to be set and the relationship of block grant money to all other funding sources would have to be considered in the course of the negotiations.

4. The extent to which the negotiating process should be staged or tiered in order to handle the broad scope of the subject matter.
Options:

- a. Agreement on ground rules, philosophical base, data base and objectives should be considered first; determination of specific allocations should be considered last.
- b. Agreement on state agency/municipal/private percentage of total funds first; separate negotiations within each category thereafter.
- c. Agreement on percentage of funds for each objective or program/service first; negotiation on detailed allocation within each category thereafter.

- d. Local based negotiations concurrent with statewide negotiations in order to test central results with locally generated agreements.

The Subcommittee noted that option D-1 was essential regardless of the negotiating approach. It also recommended utilizing a combination of options b and c, whereby an agreement could be reached first on state/local/private shares, with determination of appropriate portions of the latter two made by the appropriate state agency.

(Note: This position apparently evolved because SSBG funds which the various state agencies receive frequently go to towns and private providers through the subcontract process. Thus, each state agency had both interest and expertise in the activities of the other two sectors in the negotiations. Everyone agreed that it would not be appropriate or feasible to specify allocations for each private or municipal provider/grantee, but that any final agreement would have to specify to the satisfaction of all parties how and by whom such determinations would be made.)

C. OPM and the Kettering Foundation: A More Formal Relationship

The observations and conclusions of this Subcommittee of the Governor's Block Grant Task Force then became the agenda for the second OPM/Kettering Foundation meeting, scheduled for December 15, 1981. At this meeting OPM and Kettering staff agreed on both the feasibility of mounting an NIS to manage the SSBG and the general design suggested by OPM. OPM's primary concerns were with feasibility, design and assistance, both technical and financial. Conversely, the Kettering Foundation's primary concerns revolved around questions of feasibility, appropriateness and compatibility of ends. The Foundation was concerned with mounting a successful NIS. The essential element in ensuring success, from their view, was obtaining Governor O'Neill's commitment to make the NIS agreement the Executive Branch's plan for allocation of the SSBG. OPM concurred but had not as yet sought the Governor's commitment. Both parties agreed to enter into a working arrangement on the assumption that the Governor's support would be obtained.

An OPM/Kettering Foundation letter of understanding, signed in January, 1982, preserved most of the language of the design and implementation recommendations discussed during the meetings of 19 November and 15 December. Each party recognized that the design and implementation steps noted in the agreement were merely preliminary and that much preparation work remained to be done.

Also, several new elements surfaced in the January Letter of Understanding. Because the Connecticut effort was to be a significant departure from previous NIS experiments, both parties expressed an interest and commitment to preserving and disseminating the lessons learned during the process. It was agreed that this would best be achieved by conducting a formal evaluation and by meticulously documenting, through written and audiovisual means, the entire process. In this regard, OPM decided to apply for funding through the

Department of Health and Human Services, which had, fortuitously, just made discretionary funds available for innovative projects concerning block grant management. The Kettering Foundation provided technical support in preparing the application.

The replication package described in OPM's preapplication contained several major elements, including:

- o Explanatory and promotional literature.
- o A formal evaluation.
- o A case history.
- o An audiovisual presentation.

The formal evaluation was to be guided by three principles:

- o It was to be objective.
- o It was not to intrude on or influence the outcome of the negotiations.
- o It was to provide practical knowledge for use in the refinement, improvement and further application of the NIS model.

The training manual was designed to be a detailed "how to" guide for conducting an NIS such as the one Connecticut was mounting. The audiovisual presentation was to include two components; excerpts from the formal negotiating sessions and a series of interviews with key participants.

Additionally, the Foundation agreed to help OPM select a mediator and raise funds from Connecticut's community foundations to pay for the costs associated with mediation and for staff support for non-State participants. State team staff support was to be supplied by the various agencies involved.

Finally, the OPM/Kettering Foundation Letter of Understanding contained a general statement of what was expected from the NIS experiment. This ambitious statement took the form of one goal and eight objectives.

D. Goal and Objectives

The goal of the negotiated process is to improve the techniques of intra- and intergovernmental decision-making. Objectives include design and testing of an innovative approach for allocation of limited block grant funds which will meet the following objectives:

- o Demonstrate the ability of state government to make effective use of the authority delegated to the states and provide a model process which can be replicated by other states;
- o Provide an opportunity to place an array of human services delivery issues on the table and obtain agreement on the relative importance of each;

- o Provide an opportunity to place individual agency and grantee program requests in the context of overall needs and subject those requests to scrutiny by peer agencies or claimants;
- o Permit those claimants to see and understand all of the other claims on the same limited funding;
- o Provide an opportunity for municipal and private, non-profit service providers to participate in the decision-making process and to make their concerns and priorities known to State agencies;
- o Develop a block grant allocation process which permits all or most of the funding claimants to agree to the result;
- o Develop a more effective allocation of block grant funding than can be achieved through more conventional procedures. ("Effectiveness" in this case must be judged in terms of the amount of service to be provided, the extent to which that service is consistent with the needs which the participants identify as the most important, and the level of consensus achieved through the negotiating process); and
- o Provide a mechanism for agreement on changes in policy, procedure or agency roles which will improve the effectiveness of SSBG use in Connecticut.

E. Refining the NIS Design for Connecticut

On May 3 and 4, 1982 OPM and Kettering Foundation staff held a series of meetings and briefings designed to resolve the remaining NIS design problems and to introduce state agency and municipal leaders to the upcoming NIS experiment.

On the morning of 3 May OPM and Kettering Foundation staff met to refine and elaborate further the NIS design laid out during the meetings of November and December. The first concern was determination of which state agencies should participate. There were two obvious options:

- o Include only those agencies which were traditionally identified with Title XX.
- o Include all agencies which provided eligible social services.

During 1982 some fourteen state agencies received SSBG funds. An additional four agencies were identified as "eligible" but not participating. While no final decision was made at the 3 May meeting with regard to the makeup of the state team, concern was expressed that the state negotiating team should not be too large. Accordingly, OPM and Kettering staff agreed that the state negotiating team should contain fewer members than the potential list suggested, although all agencies involved should play a consultative role.

If the makeup of the state team remained a problem, formation of municipal and private sector negotiating teams seemed even more

difficult. The Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (CCM) and the Council of Small Towns (COST) had been identified as appropriate places to start with regard to a team to represent Connecticut's 169 towns. Accordingly, representatives from the two municipal organizations were invited to attend a briefing session the next day.

OPM and the Kettering Foundation staffs both assumed that formation of a negotiating team acceptable to the vast majority of private social service providers would prove the most difficult of the three. There were potentially 15 or 20 state agencies involved in the SSBG. At most only 169 towns could claim a right to have a voice in the NIS process. There were, however, many hundreds of private, non-profit service providers who had a stake in any new allocation of the SSBG. Additionally, many private foundations and corporations funded social services and a way was needed to involve them in the process. Finding a mechanism for representation of such a wide array of agencies appeared to pose the biggest hurdle in mounting the NIS. Several options for resolving this problem were discussed:

- o Approach a number of statewide associations and ask them to select a team.
- o Organize the private sector team from among members of the various advisory groups, boards and committees which are associated with the various state human service agencies.
- o Ask the Connecticut Association for Human Services to select a team, as this organization is the most broadly based and representative in the state.

Ultimately, it was agreed that option one was the most apt. Finally, it was decided that the remaining portion of the private sector not represented directly on a negotiating team would be invited to participate as part of an observer team.

The role which the Connecticut General Assembly would play in the NIS was still undetermined. However, there was general agreement that the nature and timing of the NIS made direct involvement unlikely. The preferred option on this point again involved a combination of inviting key members of the General Assembly to attend sessions and providing periodic briefings on the progress of the negotiations to members.

Two questions remained with regard to selecting a mediator: what style of mediation did Connecticut want? At what point did it want to hire a mediator? The first question, involving qualifications and style, would depend largely on the caliber and nature of the applicants. The second question was a delicate one, for it involved the problems of whether the other teams should be included in the selection process (thus delaying selection until these teams were formed), and whether the mediator should be involved in the NIS design process (thus implying that a mediator should be hired as soon as possible). The need for haste seemed to rule out awaiting formation of the other negotiating teams or delaying the design work on the NIS. Both OPM and the Foundation agreed that it would be best to proceed on all fronts and hope to have the

final mediator candidates lined up on time to have them screened by all three teams.

Finally, OPM and the Kettering Foundation agreed that the framework for the NIS should include, at a minimum, the following:

- o All federal and state legal requirements are a "given."
- o If the funding level for the SSBG is not known at the outset, negotiations must proceed on an agreed-upon basis (the President's proposed budget or the previous year's level). If the funding level changes from that negotiated, an agreement on how the adjustments are to be made post-NIS will have to be worked out.
- o A firm time schedule to allow public hearings and legislative review.
- o The level of detail of the final agreement should be agreed to by the teams. (It should be noted, however, that the Governor's budget has traditionally not included individual grant decisions, but included only line items.)
- o Negotiators must have authority to speak for and commit their agencies or constituents.
- o Each team should have a single spokesperson.
- o All participants should agree to the mediator selected.
- o All participants must agree in writing to abide by the final negotiated settlement.

During the remainder of May 3 and 4, Kettering Foundation and OPM staff held continuous orientation briefings for the agencies, both state and municipal, which had been identified as potential NIS participants. Those invited included the Commissioners of eighteen state human service agencies and the directors of CCM and COST. The sessions were purely informational and were not intended to elicit design feedback. (At the end of the 4 May meeting representatives of CCM and COST were asked to take the lead in forming a municipal negotiating team.) The executive directors of these two municipal lobbying groups agreed to recommend their participation in the NIS process to their respective Boards.

III. ORGANIZING FOR NEGOTIATIONS

A. In Search of a Private, Non-Profit Team

With the process of briefing the potential government participants on the upcoming NIS completed, OPM and the Kettering Foundation immediately proceeded to the task of organizing a private, non-profit negotiating team. In order to facilitate this task OPM asked all involved state agencies to submit lists of statewide organizations representing private, non-profit service providers. Utilizing these and other lists OPM invited representatives from over 30 private, non-profit providers to attend a 3 June briefing on NIS.

Although hardly an all-inclusive list, the organizations attending represented literally hundreds of human service providers of virtually every type of social service. The briefing was the state's first opportunity to explain the role that the private, non-profit sector might play in the negotiations. The effort bore fruit very quickly.

OPM immediately asked their help in forming a private sector negotiating team with the following characteristics:

- o Skills in all service areas.
- o Skilled negotiators.
- o Negotiators who were credible with the broadest possible array of providers.
- o Negotiators who were willing to invest the time and effort necessary to a successful negotiation. (It was estimated that the NIS would require team members to spend 20% of their working time.)
- o A negotiating team with evidence of consumer representation.
- o Balanced geographical representation. (A premise here was that the private, non-profits had no claim to exclusive representation of any client or geographic group. They represented only their individual corporate status and a non-governmental point of view.)

The private, non-profit leaders were also told that their part in the NIS was entirely dependent upon their ability to sanction a negotiating team. OPM also promised that if they succeeded, their team would receive funds contributed by Connecticut's community foundations for staff support. They were also cautioned that the NIS would go forward, even if they could not field a team.

Although it was made clear that most of the ground rules governing the negotiations would themselves be subject to negotiation, OPM suggested several that it deemed essential to a successful NIS. Included among these were:

- o Allocations to specific grantees would not be made.
- o Negotiations would follow a two-tiered approach, with horizontal negotiations among the constituents of the teams, followed by vertical negotiations among the three sectors carried out by three, 5-8 person, negotiating teams.
- o The private, non-profit team must provide for adequate representation of the current SSBG recipients.

After this initial briefing, at the suggestion of the private, non-profit representatives, state officials departed. The process of forming a negotiating team began immediately. The private, non-profit


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
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leaders immediately elected a temporary chairperson, formed a committee of four to represent the group in the mediator selection process and appointed a committee of ten to identify and enlist additional organizations to be included in the negotiations.

Within a few short weeks, this core group of private, non-profit sector leaders grew to about fifty organizations, elected a twenty-five member steering committee and accredited a five-member negotiating committee. Given the large number of organizations involved, the speed with which the spokespersons for the private, non-profit human service community fielded their team was surprising. Clearly, there was a more elaborate web of communication between private sector providers and a greater sense of unity of purpose and trust among them than most informed observers had supposed. Theirs was a most impressive organizational feat. State officials were particularly impressed with the interest and sense of purpose with which the private, non-profit social service provider sector embraced the NIS concept.

The leaders of these organizations quickly grasped the significance of the State's proposal and immediately assessed this experiment in government decision-making and priority-setting as an unprecedented opportunity to form a partnership with state government.

Nevertheless, some of those involved in the organization of the private, non-profit team expressed reservations that the team (and steering committee) selected was, or ever could be, truly representative of all private human service interests in the state. A few also expressed doubt that the private team could compete or negotiate as equals with the state. However, no one on the private team suggested that the private provider community could consider not participating in the NIS process.

B. Formation of the State Team

Given that there were only eighteen potential participants for inclusion on the state team, forming a state negotiating team might have proven comparatively uncomplicated. This did not turn out to be the case. The process was complicated by the manner in which Title XX had been administered in the past. Many of the agencies identified with the program did not consider themselves social service agencies. Also, a number of agencies had moved in and out of the program over the years. Finally, a number of agencies still identified with the program expressed interest in disassociating themselves from Title XX.

Additionally, once the core of state agencies to be involved in the NIS was determined, there was the problem of how to pick the five-member negotiating team. Two agencies, OPM and DHR, were certain to serve. OPM was appropriate because it was the initiator of the NIS process and because it represented the governor. OPM also had the advantage of not representing a particular client group. DHR was an essential choice because it had administered the Title XX program in the past and was, therefore, the agency with the most knowledge and experience. The rationale to be used in selecting the other three team members was not as clear. The remaining three members could be selected on the basis of

financial stake, choosing those with the greatest SSBG-related expenditures, or they could be selected on the basis of the number of clients served.

The state negotiating team would eventually be made up of a combination of large and small agencies, with corresponding SSBG budgets, but the selection process was much slower than expected. An interim state negotiating team was not selected until early August. The final five-member team was not selected until after the ground rule session of 20 September.

C. Formation of the Municipal Team

As noted earlier, OPM first approached the task of organizing a municipal team by contacting the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (CCM) and the Conference of Small Towns (COST) during the meeting of 4 May. Although the Directors of CCM and COST were immediately drawn to the NIS and recommended to their boards of directors that CCM and COST participate, they could not unilaterally commit their organizations to the process. As most Connecticut towns were members of COST or CCM, OPM initially expected quick certification of a municipal team. This early optimism proved false.

Apparently, decision was delayed in part because of the difficulty of gaining agreement on the mix of small town - big city representation on the team. While this problem was ultimately resolved and a CCM/COST sponsored team organized, the municipalities did not designate a team to represent them until 16 August. The municipal team ultimately selected contained three members from CCM and two from COST, representing the full range of small, medium and large towns in Connecticut.

D. The Mediator Selection Process

With the effort to organize and accredit the three negotiating teams well under way, OPM turned to the important task of obtaining the services of a mediator. OPM worked exclusively from the list of four interested and available mediators submitted by the Kettering Foundation. The Foundation also provided a series of criteria to be considered in the selection process. It also recommended that Connecticut utilize a team of mediators; a chief mediator, whose main skills were facilitative, and one or more assistants. Finally, the Foundation cautioned against hiring a "superstar" mediator, as this approach had not necessarily proven to be a benefit in past NIS experiences. Qualities that the Foundation advised looking for in a mediator(s) included:

- o High quality facilitative skills.
- o Experience in working with the kind of people who will participate in the negotiations.
- o Knowledge of intergovernmental relations.

- o Knowledge of (Connecticut) human services issues and delivery systems.
- o Knowledge of public sector negotiations and mediation.

Additionally, the Kettering Foundation recommended that the mediator be obtained as early in the process as possible so he or she could help organize and train the negotiating teams.

Because of the lack of time and the expectation that the private, non-profit team would have difficulty agreeing on a team, OPM had initially intended to select a mediator from among the four candidates on the Kettering Foundation list for consideration by the three teams. This "shortcut" did not prove necessary. Although none of the negotiating teams were fully organized during the mediator selection process, each party - state, local and private - succeeded in empowering representatives with authority to commit their teams to selection of a mediator. Thus, when the mediator interviews took place in mid and late June, representatives from all three sectors were able to participate. (While the municipal sector had not yet formed a team, a representative from CCM was invited to the mediator selection interviews on the assumption that the municipal team would eventually be accredited through CCM and COST.)

The mediator selection process provided the first test of how the NIS might work in the coming months. The beginning was propitious. It was agreed that no mediator would be hired who did not have the backing of each of the three teams. This "unanimity" rule would prevail throughout the negotiations on all substantive and procedural issues. While the ability to "veto" proposals agreed to by the other teams could at any time have brought the negotiations to a halt, unanimity was clearly necessary to ensure acceptance and implementation of a workable final agreement.

On July 6 Josh Stulberg, a professor of public administration at Bernard Baruch College and President of Conflict Management Resources, Inc., was hired as the head mediator for Connecticut's NIS. Following Kettering's advice, the NIS negotiators agreed that Dr. Stulberg be aided in the negotiations by two assistants, one a social service expert and the other a person familiar with the Connecticut scene. However, Dr. Stulberg did not feel that a Connecticut-based person was necessary and, with the approval of the negotiating teams, did not select one. The assistants selected to fill out the mediation team were Ernest Osborne, a former high-ranking official at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in the Carter Administration, and Michael Keating, Jr., a colleague of Dr. Stulberg.

E. Funding Arrangements

As the crucial task of organizing the negotiating teams was proceeding, OPM staff was also involved in the important business of securing funds for the NIS and for the production of a replication package. Earlier in the year, OPM and Kettering Foundation staff had outlined a course of action for securing needed funds. This included a federal grant

application to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), for funds to allow Connecticut to produce an evaluation and replication package, and a fund raising effort, whose focus would be Connecticut's community foundations for public giving, to pay for the mediator team and staff support for the two non-State teams.

An initial meeting with several community foundation officials was positive. Several foundations expressed enthusiastic support for the NIS approach and agreed to approach a number of additional organizations to ensure sufficient financial support. Ultimately, five Connecticut community foundations, in Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport, Norwalk and Stamford, contributed \$39,350 to support the NIS.

Importantly, the Kettering Foundation agreed to administer funds provided by the Connecticut community foundations. This service was vital if the mediator(s) and non-state team staff were to be viewed as independent. If these funds had been administered by OPM or any other state party, there would have been at least the appearance that the mediator was a representative of the state rather than an impartial participant.

Federal action on the preapplication OPM had sent off to HHS in January was delayed by almost seven months. An uncertain budget picture was further complicated by the nearly 5,600 preapplications received for review. In August HHS finally received permission to fund the program and solicit final applications. Connecticut was asked to submit a final application, but there was a further delay of two months before a funding commitment was received. Despite receiving early indications that its preapplication had been well received, the delay in funding meant that planning for the replication package (obtaining the services of consultants and a producer for the audiovisual presentations) had to proceed without a firm commitment of funds to pay for it.

F. Pre-Negotiation Orientation and Preparation

During late July and August the mediator and his assistants met several times with each of the negotiating teams. At these "orientation" sessions the mediator sought to accomplish several aims:

- o to gain the trust and confidence of the negotiators;
- o to explain how he intended to play his role as mediator; and
- o to obtain feedback on what "ground rules" would be generally acceptable to the parties.

With regard to the first two concerns, the mediator assured everyone that not only would he be impartial, he would strive to ensure that each of the three teams functioned as equals. To this end, he encouraged each team to develop its own expert staff and sources of information. He also expressed his intention to make certain that all information generated by or available to any team would be shared with each of the other teams.

With regard to ground rules, the mediator asked that each team respond to a series of procedural concerns in preparation for a pre-negotiations ground rules meeting to be held in late September. These concerns included:

- o Team Composition
 - o size
 - o spokesperson(s)
- o Convention/Procedures
 - o coordination
 - o documentation
 - o caucusing
 - o time restraints
- o Exchange of Information
- o The Role of Non-negotiating Parties
 - o funders
 - o evaluators
 - o legislative representatives
 - o the public
 - o the media

It should be noted, however, that through at least September the NIS start-up process remained very fluid. Although participants had been identified and team formation proceeded apace, consensus with regard to what was being negotiated and how negotiations were to be conducted was not achieved easily. During July, August and September the mediator devoted a great deal of time and effort working with each of the negotiating sectors to resolve these procedural problems.

As late as September the state and private sectors were experiencing problems which threatened to delay or even prevent the start of negotiations. Two examples of these start-up problems are noteworthy. The lack of sufficient financial support and information gathering problems prompted the private sector team to reconsider participating as late as 8 September. The participating state agencies and difficulty agreeing on a negotiating team and, in fact, did not select a final team until after the ground rules joint session of 20 September. In each instance the mediator's assistance was helpful in resolving the problem.

G. Agreement on Rules of Procedure

On 20 September the three negotiating teams met together for the first time. Two topics dominated this pre-negotiation session: establishment of ground rules for the first substantive negotiating session and setting an agenda for this first session. The ground rules agreed to at this session included:

- o There were to be five members on each team.
- o Each team was to designate a spokesperson.

- o Team members pledged to attend all meetings.
- o Each team could have up to five resource people.
- o All sessions were to be open to the public.
- o Selected legislators were to be invited to attend sessions.
- o A caucus could be called at any time by any team.
- o Each team pledged to share all information and respond to requests for information as promptly as possible.
- o The mediator was to prepare minutes of each joint session.
- o Each team was to appoint a documentor to keep team records, proposals, communications.
- o All teams were encouraged to communicate with each other between joint sessions.
- o The mediator was to coordinate meeting times and places, develop agenda, control the flow of the sessions and assist teams in writing a formal proposal.
- o Each team was empowered to speak on behalf of its respective constituency.

The three teams also agreed that the main topics to be addressed at the first substantive session, set for 12 October, would be development of and agreement on issues to be addressed in a final agreement, and the principles that would guide the discussion of these issues.

Finally, the private, non-profit team expressed its need for additional financial and technical assistance. Their team would be disadvantaged in the negotiations, they argued, because the other teams had greater resources. Initially, \$5,000 had been budgeted for each of the non-state teams for staff. The private, non-profit team, especially, believed this sum inadequate. State team members agreed to provide additional "in-kind" assistance as needed. Also, the private, non-profit team eventually managed to raise additional funds for staff through several corporate contributions.

H. Establishing Initial Team Positions

Articulation of gains to be sought or positions to be defended began even as the three negotiating teams were being organized. First, in a general sense, ensuring a successful negotiation became an early objective of all three groups. Most of the individual agencies and towns involved in the SSBG (and thus the NIS) viewed the NIS as a significant break from traditional budget-making practices in Connecticut and supported the process from the outset. And, having publicly acknowledged the importance of the experiment, everyone involved had a stake in making sure that an acceptable agreement emerged.

1. The State Agencies

Historically, Title XX was administered by the Department of Human Resources (DHR), with OPM playing an oversight role. The other state agencies involved in Title XX seldom had a voice in the allocation of these funds. Thus, most of the state agencies involved in the NIS supported the process as a means of opening up the budget and planning process.

Only OPM and DHR would be giving up authority in implementing the NIS process. Since these were the agencies responsible for the SSBG, the NIS would, if successful, impinge upon their budget-making and administrative oversight functions. However, CPM had initiated the NIS process and clearly perceived the loss of budget authority as a trade-off for political gains and possible improvements in strategic planning.

DHR was initially unenthusiastic about utilization of NIS for allocation of the SSBG. The process would clearly be an infringement on its lead agency status. Nonetheless, the Governor was committed to employing the NIS process in the case of the SSBG and DHR had little choice but to participate actively. Still, even though DHR was to be only one of a number of agencies involved in the NIS process, it would of necessity play an extremely important role. In its position as lead agency for the SSBG, DHR knew more about how the program functioned than any other party to the proposed negotiations.

A number of state agencies had become associated with Title XX even though they were not, strictly speaking, part of the traditional human services community. These agencies had long expressed an interest in disassociating themselves from the SSBG. Furthermore, they were eager to withdraw from the SSBG because it was commonly assumed that SSBG funds would continue to shrink in future years. The eight remaining state agencies agreed to this withdrawal and an early state team deal was cut to allow the non-traditional human services agencies to "swap out" of the SSBG.

This so called "swap" required the withdrawing agencies to transfer their SSBG-budgeted funds to the "traditional" human services agencies remaining in the SSBG. These agencies in turn transferred funds budgeted from the state general fund to the "swapping-out" agencies. But because SSBG funds were deemed less "desirable" than general fund monies (SSBG funds were considered "soft"), the agencies "swapping" out of the SSBG were required to trade \$113.50 of SSBG money for every \$100 of general fund money they received (or a 13.5% premium). This rather complex and confusing agreement would, however, have to be acceptable to the other parties in the negotiations.

2. The Private, Non-Profits

Some early objectives of the private, non-profit sector, aside from the common need for more money for services, concerned reform of the State's (DHR's) SSBG administrative practices. A major goal of the "New Federalism" had been to reduce regulatory and administrative burdens. The private, non-profit sector had a number of long-standing complaints regarding excessive and duplicative paper work and oversight, timely payment of approved grants, permission to deposit grant funds in interest bearing accounts and a fairer and more uniform method of soliciting and evaluating grant proposals. The private, non-profit team decided early to raise these "New Federalism"-type issues as major concerns during the NIS. Given that the primary function of the NIS was to

produce an allocation formula, the private, non-profit team would spend much time and effort, and win considerable success, pushing their "administrative" concerns during the negotiations.

3. The Municipalities

A major pre-negotiation objective of the municipal team appears to have involved finding a creative way to avoid excessive funding cuts and to enhance the ability of towns to ensure effective delivery of services to their citizens. The municipal "share" of SSBG funds was by far the smallest of the three groups. Also, a large proportion of their SSBG funds was used to provide information and referral, transportation, counseling, and recreation type services. In any scheme designed to establish priorities, these kinds of services would do poorly. Municipal team leaders seemed to have understood this before negotiations began and took up the search early for a negotiating strategy which might minimize their losses while at the same time ensuring that SSBG funds were used effectively and efficiently.

The strategy which the municipal team appears to have pursued included a two-pronged approach. First, the municipal team developed an entirely new service. This service, which the team called client-centered coordination of services, was vaguely defined but tailored to dovetail with the self-defined strengths of municipal social services departments, namely coordination of services. Second, the municipal team spokesman adopted a very aggressive negotiating style, the effect of which was to signal to the other parties that a breakdown of negotiations was possible if municipal interests were ignored and no attention was paid to the need for better coordination of efforts at the local level.

Like the non-profits, the municipalities also expressed an early interest in reducing the administrative burdens long associated with Title XX. Interestingly, this concern for reducing regulations and paperwork was one of the few areas of commonality to materialize between the municipalities and the private, non-profits. Initially, many observers supposed that the private, non-profit team leaders and their municipal team counterparts would have frequent occasion to make common cause against the state team. The SSBG was, after all, a state-administered grant. However, it quickly became clear that the interests of the municipal and private teams would not coincide as often as expected.

I. Data Base Development

Accurate and timely information regarding expenditure of Title XX and SSBG funds historically had been hard to come by. Funds were disbursed among hundreds of state, municipal and private, non-profit service providers, and only scant resources were utilized to track the uses of these funds. Information on clients and their characteristics was often incomplete or difficult to aggregate meaningfully.

This lack of good data had inhibited the State's ability to plan for human services effectively, although it had not proven a stumbling block to receiving full federal reimbursement under Title XX. If the NIS

negotiators were to discuss a reallocation of SSBG dollars from other than a "gut level", they would require better information than had ever been generated in the past. Also, the NIS negotiators requested that even the information that was available be organized more usefully than had the data which had been produced to meet minimum federal reporting requirements.

During September, each of the teams proceeded independently to create a data base that would help them develop their negotiating positions. The private, non-profit and the municipal teams surveyed their constituents to determine where resources went, to whom and the extent of the gap between their needs and resources. While these efforts may have helped them develop their negotiating positions, neither the private nor the municipal team shared this data with the other teams. Neither utilized their data extensively in a negotiating session.

This was entirely understandable. Neither team was in a position, or had the resources necessary, to produce the "big picture" of the SSBG for the negotiations. Clearly, only the state team, which could draw on the resources of many state agencies, might come close. That the State would of necessity be the primary source of data for the NIS had been recognized early. In fact, by September OPM had started to work with DHR to coordinate preparation of a comprehensive data resource book containing information that each of the teams could understand and utilize during the negotiations. By the time negotiations began, DHR staff, with the assistance of several other state agencies, managed to produce what everyone involved agreed was the most comprehensive, informative and understandable description of where, to whom and for what SSBG funds went ever produced.

IV. THE BARGAINING PROCESS

A. The Formal Negotiations Begin: The First Public Joint Session

Negotiations began in earnest on 12 October with considerable fanfare and many expressions of goodwill. Lt. Governor Joseph J. Fauliso, representing Governor O'Neill, opened the session by noting that the negotiators were "more than an advisory committee," they were "decision-makers." Lt. Governor Fauliso then charged the three teams "to work together to develop a consensus" on SSBG priorities and allocations.

With the ceremonies out of the way, the actual work of the NIS began. The state team opened by identifying three elements of its general approach to the negotiations. First, the state team presented its recently compiled data resource book and proposed that it be adopted as the official data base for the negotiations. Next, the state team distributed a list of seven issues it believed a final agreement should address. Finally, it offered an initial draft of the team's position with regard to guiding principles and operating assumptions.

Both non-state teams readily accepted the state data resource book. Then each in turn presented its own version of the proposed contents of the final agreement, guiding principles and operating assumptions. As there was little difference among the three teams with regard to ground to be covered in the final agreement, consensus was reached quickly on

this matter and by mid-afternoon the following items for inclusion in the agreement were identified:

- o A preamble stating the purpose and scope of the SSBG.
- o Definition of services and target populations.
- o Service priorities.
- o Specific allocations identified.
- o A multi-year implementation plan and process.
- o Evaluation standards and processes.
- o Criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers.
- o General operating principles.

Complete agreement on the day's remaining agenda items eluded the negotiators. Nevertheless, the following "governing principles" were adopted:

- o Performance criteria should be established for selection and evaluation of service providers.
- o A consistent and comprehensive data base should be developed.
- o Funding decisions should minimize adverse effects on persons receiving services.
- o All applicable civil rights statutes and regulations should be observed.
- o Funding decisions should be based on:
 - o Agreed-to service priorities, which in turn would be based on need and other criteria.
 - o Agreed-to criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers.

Two areas which posed problems were state "oversight," or monitoring activities, and evaluation and selection of service provider criteria. Both non-state teams contended that state oversight activities were often duplicative, and wished to reduce the burdens of this function. Several state agencies expressed concern that a commitment to reducing oversight activities would conflict with state and federal mandates and regulations. The private, non-profit team was especially sensitive to proposals for establishing or revamping procedures for evaluating and selecting service providers and withheld its approval of this operating principle until it could seek advice from its steering committee.

While the first session did not produce agreement on all agenda items, it was clearly a success. Especially important was the establishment of a cooperative, non-combative negotiating tone. In keeping with this cooperative spirit, the teams agreed on a division of labor in preparing study materials and proposals for the next joint session, scheduled for 3 November. The private, non-profit team agreed to produce a draft preamble for the funding agreement to serve as a starting point for discussions. The state team was asked to provide all available information on current evaluation standards, instruments and processes. Additionally, each team agreed to draft a set of criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers for consideration before the next session.

The final item placed on the agenda for the 3 November session was one of the most important and difficult aims of the negotiations. Each team was asked to develop their initial list of service priorities. Services were to be ranked in three categories: high, medium and low.

Throughout the negotiations each team was encouraged to circulate its products and proposals well in advance of the joint session at which they were scheduled for discussion. This pattern was established at the first joint session and was initially observed by the three teams. As the negotiations neared completion, however, this practice broke down and the teams often saw each other's proposals and counterproposals for the first time at the joint sessions. This "breakdown," while perhaps inevitable in the crush of events, no doubt caused some confusion and resulted in a loss of efficiency.

B. Horizontal Negotiations: Intra-Team Meetings/Negotiations

Connecticut's NIS was designed for tiered negotiations. This meant not only that the complex subject matter would be tiered, but that there were to be two levels of negotiations: on the first level, negotiating positions were developed by each team; on the second level, these team positions were then to be the subject of negotiations in the joint sessions. Prior to and throughout the NIS, each team held numerous intra-team negotiating sessions. Such sessions were held before the NIS began in order to select team members, develop procedures, articulate negotiating strategies and define initial positions on issues. The mediator often attended intra-team meetings to assist the teams in developing negotiating positions and resolving organizational problems. Intra-team meetings, or negotiating sessions, became more frequent once the joint sessions began. Each team held at least one such session between each of the five joint sessions.

While no attempt will be made here to provide a description of these intra-team "negotiating" sessions, their importance cannot be minimized. Unlike the joint sessions, the intra-team sessions were not open to the public. Discussion in them was inevitably more frank and informal. The intra-team sessions were the appropriate place for parochial expressions of self-interest by individual team members. Accordingly, team positions were usually compromises worked out during these meetings.

For those who wish to obtain a feel for the level of effort involved in these intra-team meetings, a calender of all meetings relevant to the NIS has been included in an appendix which lists all major events, including intra- and inter-team negotiating sessions. Also, no attempt has been made here to provide a detailed, comprehensive description of every meeting, event or proposal. However, in order to provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how issues were raised and decided, and a "feel" for the "atmosphere" in which the negotiations took place, a description of the events of the third joint session is provided in considerable detail. All other joint sessions have been treated in summary fashion.

C. The Second Joint Session: Laying the Groundwork for Priority-Setting

The second joint session took place over two days, 3-4 November, and revolved around the issues of service definitions and priorities, identification of conditions of vulnerability and criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers. A sharing of "first-cuts" at setting service priorities was scheduled for the end of the day. Each team had developed their positions prior to the 3 November session and, through the mediator, had shared their views with the other teams.

In addition to the agenda items agreed to during the first session, both the State and the private teams placed new proposals before the negotiators for consideration. The additional private team proposal dealt with several of their administrative concerns, including timely payment to grantees, permission to keep SSBG funds in interest-bearing accounts, and the financing of short-term borrowing. The state's additional proposal, alluded to earlier, involved the "swapping-out" of the SSBG by several state agencies.

While the municipal team offered no new agenda items for consideration, it quickly moved to introduce an item which lay at the heart of its negotiating strategy. Within the context of defining services, the municipal team proposed an entirely new service. This new service, client-centered coordination of services, was defined generally as a method of maximizing at minimum cost the services provided to clients through increased coordination of efforts.

After each team had presented its position on these several issues, the State team introduced a series of responses to the proposals of the other two teams. These "counterproposals" were designed to highlight areas of agreement and reconcile differences.

The results of the 3 November session can be summed up thus: most service definitions were agreed to (the municipal team's new service being one of the few exceptions); several administrative functions were defined and accepted; the non-state teams were confused by the state's "swap" proposal and there was considerable similarity between the state and municipal teams' lists of service priorities. The private, non-profit submittal was formulated inconsistently with the other teams' lists, which inhibited further discussion of service priorities at this point.

The 4 November session was largely taken up with a discussion of setting priorities and the criteria to be used in this process. The priorities submitted by the private team on the previous day diverged greatly from those presented by the two "government" teams. The private, non-profit team had proposed that all low priority funds be state agency funds. Furthermore, it had identified and mixed services and agencies in its lists. In view of the fact that the state and municipal teams had presented lists which were formed similarly and which ranked services similarly, the private sector team agreed to revamp its proposal along the lines presented by the other two teams. The need for such a compatible service priority list meant that discussion of and agreement on priorities would be delayed until at least the next joint session.

At the request of the private, non-profit team, the state clarified its position on funding via a priorities list. It was the State's position that high priority services should be eligible for increases, medium priority services should receive "status quo" funding and that low priority services would face reduced funding. Only the private sector team readily accepted this approach.

At the close of the 4 November session, the state team offered three documents for consideration at the next joint session, scheduled for 23 November. These included definitions of vulnerable populations and criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers.

D. The Third Joint Session: Service Priorities Continued

When the three NIS negotiating teams met for the third joint session on November 23, 1982, the most important and difficult issues had not been resolved. Only one more joint session was scheduled beyond the 23rd. The negotiations were already falling behind schedule. If agreement was to be reached in time for items affecting the state budget to be reflected in the Governor's budget for 1984, the pace of the negotiations would have to be stepped up.

The pivotal issue of establishing service priorities, which in turn would provide the rationale for allocating SSBG funds, had been unsatisfactorily addressed at the 3-4 November joint session. Effective discussion of this issue at the 3-4 November session had been delayed by the lack of comparability of the initial proposals. Accordingly, the service priorities issue was the first item scheduled for discussion during the 23 November session. Virtually the entire session was taken up with working out an agreement in this sensitive area.

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The site of the third joint session was held at the Farmington Marriott Motor Hotel. The formal negotiations were held in a large, rather typical hotel meeting room which had a capacity of about 200. Physical arrangements included long conference tables arrayed in a large square, with each of the negotiating teams and the mediator team occupying one side each. Staff members, five for each of the three teams, were seated immediately behind their respective negotiating teams. An official

observer team was seated off to the side and behind the mediator team table. There was seating at the rear of the meeting room for about fifty additional persons. Audiovisual equipment occupied a rear corner.

Throughout the negotiations, the non-participating audience numbered about 40-50 persons and was made up largely of representatives from interested human services agencies, academic researchers studying the process and members of the press. Occasionally, members of the Connecticut General Assembly attended.

When the mediator called the third joint session to order shortly after 9:00 a.m., he immediately asked the three teams to focus their attention on the pressing problem of establishing criteria of service importance and setting service priorities. During the several weeks since the second joint session, each of the teams had redrafted their service priority lists and shared these new lists with each other. The mediator proposed that each team formally introduce their new lists and, hopefully, any changes made in them that may have been promoted by the other teams' proposals. Since the private, non-profit team's list had undergone the most radical change, at least in format, the mediator asked it to begin the discussion.

The private sector team began its presentation by noting how troubling the process of prioritization had been for them. A factor which had made their task especially difficult was the effect that changes in service definitions had on the data provided previously by the state. Initially, the state had presented information broken out by the original nineteen services. During the second joint session, the list of services had been reduced to eighteen and redefined in such a way as to make the original data (by service) somewhat confusing.

More fundamentally, the private sector team was concerned that services placed in the low category would be perceived as unimportant and defunded. With this possibility in mind, it introduced a new concept for assessing services for funding purposes. When a service, such as counseling, the private sector team spokespersons argued, was an integral or subordinate part of another service, it should be considered as part of the primary service. Despite the difficulty of defining how such assessments could be made, both the municipal and state teams readily agreed to this proposal.

The municipal team began its presentation of service priorities by noting the large areas of agreement. A notable exception, however, was the failure of the other two teams to include the municipal team's new client-centered coordination of services (CCCS) in their lists of service priorities. Furthermore, the municipal team was concerned that service coordination was cited as a state criteria for selection of service providers. CCCS was not, they insisted, a criterion for anything, but was a vital service in itself.

Ignoring the municipal team's complaint, the private sector team wanted to know why the municipal team had placed child day care in the low priority category. Both the state and private sector team lists had pegged child day care in the high priority category. The municipal team

spokesman made reference to the team's service ranking process, but admitted he could not remember the reasoning behind the child day care ranking. The distance separating the teams on CCCS and child day care was indicative of how far the negotiations had to move.

Taking the floor next, the state team presented several documents for consideration, including a composite service priorities list, a matrix analyzing service importance and a one-page document showing the fiscal impact of the changes made in service definitions at the last session. Utilizing these three documents, the state team proceeded to explain changes it had made from its initial list of service priorities. A change which immediately aroused the interest of the other teams involved the Department of Children and Youth Services' shifting funds from adoption/foster care into the residential treatment service category.

The reason for this shift and its ramifications are too involved to go into in this "short" history of the NIS. However, the problem stemmed largely from DCYS' earlier misreading of federal regulations regarding eligible expenditures. It is sufficient to note here that at the end of a lengthy and confused discussion of the issue, both the private and municipal teams accepted the state's proposed changes. The private sector team accepted the change based on the fact that most of the money used to fund residential treatment went to private, non-profit providers. The municipal team acquiesced because the changes did not appear to involve an interest vital to municipalities.

At this point, the mediator asked the teams to turn to consideration of the various proposals regarding indicators of service importance. The state team's matrix quickly became the focus of this discussion. The mediator pointed out that the proposals of the three teams were very similar, but that the state's matrix contained three criteria that the others did not. These included:

- o legislative mandates
- o Human Services Annual Agenda
- o services to the poor or near poor

Both the private and municipal teams had problems with each of these criteria, with the private sector team voicing the stronger objections. The municipal team admitted some confusion over the difference between the criteria of service importance and definitions of vulnerable populations.

The private sector team objected most strongly to the inclusion of the Annual Agenda (a legally mandated public forum mechanism designed to help the Governor establish human services priorities) as a criterion. The Annual Agenda, it insisted, was less than effective. And besides, the private team leader noted, the NIS was a more appropriate and effective tool for priority-setting. Finally, the private sector team demanded a list of legislative mandates affecting human services before they would agree to include it in the list of criteria.

This demand moved the state team spokesman to the first "sharp" exchange of the negotiations. "How many more tasks would the state team be asked to perform?" he grumbled. Criticizing the private team's consuming interest in detail, he urged the negotiators to be more "visceral." "We do not," he pleaded, "have to agree on all of the criteria" (of service importance).

In this sentiment, the state team leader was supported by the municipal team leader, who noted that differences over detail would inevitably have to be ironed out by some post-NIS committee. Nonetheless, in this instance, the municipal team leader insisted that agreement on criteria of service importance was crucial if future managers of the agreement were to understand the basis on which service priorities were set.

The mediator wisely called for a fifteen minute break. This fifteen minute break stretched into an hour and a half. During this "short" break, the mediator and team leaders engaged in a form of "shuttle diplomacy" among the three teams, the result of which was an agreement on the criteria of service importance to be used for priority-setting. When negotiations resumed, the mediator formalized the agreement reached during the break and moved immediately to discussion of service priorities.

At this point, the mediator set up a series of flip charts indicating where the teams both differed and agreed on service priorities. Additionally, the mediator accented those services where agreement appeared within reach. He then asked the teams to focus their attention on those services where there was a difference of only one "step" between two or more teams. If these "easy" compromises could be made, he conjectured, perhaps the remaining differences would not seem so insurmountable.

The hoped for breakthrough did not occur. Instead of methodically building a consensus, the ensuing discussion produced a confusing series of proposals and counterproposals which appeared to frustrate the negotiators and wear patience thin. When the mediator finally suggested a break for lunch, little progress had been made toward agreement on service priorities.

During the lunch break, the state team leader and the mediator again moved among the three teams attempting to learn what combination of service priorities might move negotiations to a fruitful conclusion. The state team leader then called a team caucus to reveal what he had learned and to make recommendations. The key, he had concluded as a result of his consultations with the other team leaders, was to zero in on the counseling category. His reasoning, ultimately sound, was that counseling contained a great deal of money (about \$4 million), it would be hard to defend and, by "freeing up" so large a pot of money for redistribution to higher priority services, there would be more room for compromise in other areas. The state team agreed to support this course of action.

When formal negotiations resumed, the municipal team leader pointed out that his team's position on priorities was based on the need to come up

with a balanced distribution of services and money among the three levels. He correctly argued that the NIS would have accomplished little if only a small amount of money were made available for redistribution to higher priority services. The private sector team's priority list, he noted, would free up too little money. And, he might have added, much of the money "freed up" by the private team list would come from services associated with municipal programs. The mediator, sensing an impasse, implored the negotiators to work quickly to reach agreement. The state team leader also beseeched the three teams to reach an accord, noting that the meeting room had only been reserved until 4:30 p.m.

At this point, the state team spokesman announced his team's proposal to move counseling to a low priority and explained its rationale for doing so.

This suggestion sent the three teams off into caucuses. When they returned, a lengthy discussion revolving around the pros and cons of counseling ensued. Another short break was called. Upon return from this break, the most dramatic, and certainly the most startling, event of the negotiations occurred: the private, non-profit team announced that it was accepting the state team's modified list of service priorities in its entirety. Surprised by this sudden announcement, the municipal team called immediately for a caucus.

If the municipal team did not move considerably toward the position now shared by the state and private teams, they might be stigmatized as spoilers. Some quick rethinking of priorities was clearly in order.

When the parties resumed discussions, the municipal team introduced a new proposal which indicated that they were not yet prepared to follow the private team's example. Still insisting that more money and services had to be placed in the low category, the municipal team proposed tying all "subordinate" services together, including legal services, counseling and home management, and putting them in the low priority category.

The private sector team refused to consider the proposal. The state team spokesman, sensing a possible total breakdown of the negotiations, pressed the municipal team to back off from their new proposal and to support the state and private team list. Implying that the municipal team was not negotiating in the spirit to which everyone had committed themselves before the NIS began, the state team spokesman argued that with counseling placed in the low category with transportation, information and referral, recreation and residential treatment, sufficient funds had been freed up for redistribution.

The major sticking point from the municipal team's perspective remained the failure of the other two teams to accept high priority status for client-centered coordination of services. On this issue, the municipal team had built its negotiating strategy and it remained adamant. With both tempers and time running out, the municipal team called for yet another caucus.

During this last caucus of the day, a breakthrough was finally achieved: the municipal team agreed to accept all other elements of the state list of priorities in return for acceptance of high priority status for CCCS. The other two teams agreed to this compromise. However, the municipal team had attached a condition to its commitment to the compromise: CCS, it insisted, would have to be funded at a substantial level.

When the teams resumed formal negotiations, they fell immediately to discussion of the meaning of "substantial", as it related to funding for CCCS. The municipal team leader suggested that "substantial" meant at least \$2,000,000. The state team leader responded that it might mean considerably less. Both the state and private, non-profit teams took the position that discussion of a specific allocation for a particular service was premature. However, seeking to reassure the municipal team that its interests would be considered in any allocation plan adopted, the state team leader urged it to trust its negotiating partners to provide "credible" funding for CCCS. The municipal team "conditionally" accepted these assurances and, on this note, the third joint session ended. The vital agreement on service priorities had been made, albeit somewhat uneasily.

E. The Fourth Joint Session: Allocating SSBG Funds

The momentous fourth joint session, held over 6 and 7 December, began quietly with a discussion of the still unresolved criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers and state swap issues. The latter issue was resolved successfully without much difficulty (since neither of the non-state teams professed to understand the implications of the swap and since the state provided assurances that no currently funded non-state agency or program would suffer because of it, there was probably no ground on which they could stand in opposition). The former issue involved a number of complex, technical problems which continued to elude agreement, including cost-benefit language, administrative costs and a system for rating providers. In part, these issues caused problems because they were complex and little understood, but also because they were tied closely to another as yet unresolved issue: the creation of a mechanism for implementing and overseeing the final agreement. Little thought had been given to this matter during the NIS design phase. The mechanism for implementing the final agreement had only been alluded to. This issue, as well as a few closely related issues, would not be resolved until the very last moments of the NIS.

At the tail end of the morning session of 6 December, the state team distributed its proposal for allocation of the FFY 1984 SSBG. The state's proposal was based on the previous year's (FFY 1983) funding level, \$33,140,885. It distributed funds by service broken out into high, medium and low priority, and identified the state agency primarily responsible for administration of the dollars associated with a particular service. Finally, it listed separate "set-asides" for training, evaluation, information systems, contingency funds, administration and innovative projects. The allocation table also showed the effects of the state swap. Another feature of the state allocation

plan, and one which caused a considerable stir, was the shift of state funds identified with particular state agencies away from low priority services into higher priority ones. The break for lunch at this point gave the two non-state teams an opportunity to digest this large and complex document.

When negotiations resumed, the two non-state teams presented their own allocation formulae. Unlike the state team effort, the municipal and private team efforts were not detailed. Instead, they were general statements of principle. The central feature of the private, non-profit team allocation plan was a proposal for a seven percent increase (cost of living adjustment) for all services in the high and medium category over the previous year's allocation and a complex formula for distribution of any surplus funds. It did not identify particular services or agencies for increases or decreases. The municipal team proposal also did not contain specific allocations for services and agencies. Understandably, the more specific and comprehensive state team allocation formula quickly became the focus of the discussions.

Early discussions concerning allocation changes had been couched in terms of merit raises and cost of living adjustments (COLA's) for high priority services, COLA's for medium priority services and no increase or a decrease for low priority services. The state team's allocation formula did not utilize the COLA concept, but instead reflected the team's view of where funding shifts should occur. There were no across-the-board increases by priority category.

The state team proposed major increases for child day care, home care programs for the elderly, day treatment and emergency shelters. Cuts were recommended for counseling, information and referral and transportation. Additionally, several state agencies had won team support for redefining some of their activities. These redefinitions were explained as necessary in order to correct errors made earlier in defining agency activities and to bring agency activities in line with revisions in service definitions agreed to during the negotiations. Despite these explanations for the reclassifications, the two non-state teams took issue with the state team's service changes, as they at least appeared to be self-serving. Surprisingly, however, the protests from the two non-state teams were mild and short-lived. The state changes might have spurred a series of such "reclassifications" by the other teams but they did not.

Additionally, the two non-state teams took exception to the state team's allocation formula on the following counts:

- o It failed to include the concept of the COLA as a vehicle for increasing funds to high and medium priority services. (Both teams)
- o It failed to take into account the SSEG dollar figure listed in the latest Federal Register. (The state had been utilizing the FFY 1983 federal grant figure, preferring not to discuss an amount which had yet to be approved by Congress.) (The private, non-profit team)

- o It deleted all funds for adoption services (which had been declared ineligible for SSBG funding because of federal regulations). (The municipal team)
- o It did not provide sufficient funds for client-oriented coordination of services. (The state allocation plan budgeted this at \$250,000.) (The municipal team)

At this point, in this longest of the five joint sessions, the three teams caucused to reconsider the state team's allocation plan.

When the negotiating teams reconvened, the state team attempted to mollify the other teams on the COLA issue by agreeing to support a COLA for high and medium priority services if the SSBG were funded at a higher level than indicated in their proposal or if unexpended funds were substantial enough to warrant one. The state team also defended its positions with regard to the municipal team concern for funding infrastructure items. The state team asserted that the set-asides for various administrative and research functions and uses were sufficient. It also pointed out that providing additional funds for these purposes would mean less funds for direct services to clients.

Pacified, the private, non-profit team now took few exceptions to the state's allocation formula. It did, however, urge that money for innovative projects be made available to applicants from any of the three service categories of priority.

The remaining major division over the allocation of SSBG funds was, predictably, the level at which client-centered coordination of services should be funded. A struggle over this issue had been presaged at the end of the third session. As a counterproposal, the municipal team suggested significant changes in a number of other service categories, including increases for adoption and foster care, and decreases for I & R, counseling, recreation and residential services. The decreases were designed to "free up" enough money to fund client-centered coordination of services at the \$1,000,000 level (recall that counseling had been moved to a low priority to "free up" monies for higher priority services).

Following a series of proposals and counter-proposals and several caucuses, a consensus on the allocation formula finally emerged. It was agreed that client-centered coordination of services would be funded at the \$500,000 level, with an additional \$250,000 to be allocated from any surplus or increase in the SSBG funds. The municipal team also managed to negotiate \$200,000 for day treatment and adoption/foster care services. Finally, the three teams agreed to provide \$125,000 for transportation for a summer busing program for inner-city youth (if, again, a surplus of SSBG funds materialized - transportation, a low priority service, had been completely defunded in the state allocation formula).

Agreement on the allocation formula for FFY 1984 constituted the last major hurdle in the negotiations.* The allocation formula was to a

*See Appendix II

large degree what Connecticut's NIS was about. At the end of the long and tense 6 December session, with the allocation agreement made, the negotiators sensed that a final agreement was at hand. Nonetheless, many loose ends remained to be settled.

The negotiating teams reconvened the next morning, 7 December, a date from history that might not give cause to be overly optimistic. Two important issues and a number of relatively minor ones remained to be resolved. The relatively minor disagreements dealt with:

- o conditions of vulnerability
- o eligibility criteria
- o fees and administrative costs

The remaining important unresolved issues were the evaluation and selection of service provider criteria and what form the implementation mechanism would take.

In order to expedite resolution of the remaining issues dividing the negotiating parties, the mediator asked each team to form three work groups. Each work group was charged with the task of identifying areas of agreement and attempting to resolve areas of disagreement. This was the first time the negotiators had dealt with each other on this basis.

(Note: This is not to say that individual negotiators from each team did not interact. Indeed, there was much one-on-one dialog. There was, especially, a great deal of interaction among team spokespersons, during and between joint sessions.)

When the negotiators returned from these "workshop" like sessions, a number of problems had been resolved, including agreement on conditions of vulnerability and guiding principles. Full agreement on evaluation and selection of service providers remained elusive, however. These issues, tied as they were to post-NIS actions, were not likely to be resolved before the structure and powers of the implementing body were clarified.

Putting aside their remaining differences over evaluation and selection criteria, the negotiators took up the matter of creating a body to implement the agreement.

(Note: Early in the NIS process, it had been recognized that an entity designed and empowered to implement a final agreement would be necessary. It was clear that any agreement struck during the formal NIS process would be subject to change and in need of adjustment as implementation proceeded. "Something" would have to be responsible for authorizing and monitoring these changes. Furthermore, most of the parties to the NIS had come to the conclusion that even a successful NIS would only constitute a beginning. If the lessons and benefits derived from the NIS experience were to contribute to this reform, there would have to be created a mechanism for

institutionalization of the process. Thus the need for some sort of tripartite committee or board.)

The private, non-profit team took the lead on this post-NIS issue, proposing a statute creating a commission to implement and oversee the NIS agreement. The state team disagreed with the statutory approach because it would have required legislative action and the legislature might have removed selection authority from the three negotiating sectors. The municipal team supported the state team position. In response, the state team suggested that an informal body was more appropriate and proposed the creation of an SSBG tripartite committee. The initial elements of this proposal included a four-member committee appointed by the Governor, and a role for the Committee in review and appeal of grant determinations.

This preliminary state team proposal for a tripartite committee proved too vague and too weak to gain the private, non-profit team's complete support, but the non-profits did indicate that they could support such a committee if its powers were expanded and articulated more fully. It also continued to push to have the committee legitimized in some way. Believing that they had benefited greatly from the NIS experience, the private non-profit team was perhaps the most concerned of the three to ensure that the process continue in a structured environment. The agreement to establish a tripartite committee, plus the store of goodwill and trust which had been built up over the preceding months, cleared the way for final agreement on the sensitive issue of evaluation and selection of service providers. This accomplished, the only issues to be resolved were:

- o putting SSBG funds in interest-bearing accounts;
- o defining cost/benefit analysis;
- o agreeing to a cap on administrative costs;
- o creating a tripartite committee.

This meant, however, that the negotiations would have to continue for one extra day. The three teams agreed to meet again on 23 December and committed themselves to producing a final agreement by no later than that date.

F. Final Agreement: The Fifth Joint Session

When the NIS resumed on 23 December, the negotiators immediately fell to discussion of the tripartite committee. During the nearly three weeks since the previous joint session, the private, non-profit and state teams had exchanged several versions of their tripartite committee proposals. The private, non-profit team continued to press for the widest possible powers for the committee. A citation from their

proposal of 20 December is illustrative of the large grant of authority they sought for it:

"The Tripartite Committee shall also be responsible for deciding all matters relative to the NIS process, including but not limited to, distribution of additional federal funds, reductions of federal funds, evaluation and monitoring, implementation of criteria for the selection of service providers."

The municipal team had staked its negotiating fortunes on the vaguely defined concept of client-centered coordination of services and had prevailed. The private, non-profit team, which had been supportive of many state team initiatives, including the important issues of service priorities and allocations, was apparently now, at the eleventh hour, pushing the negotiations to the limit in order to ensure that the private sector continue to enjoy a direct and effective role in administering SSBG funds. Having complained for years about their inability to deal effectively as equals with the state bureaucracy, the private, non-profits now pressed hard to continue the process which had finally given them the access and influence they had long sought.

While most members of the state team expressed support for both the NIS and a tripartite process for overseeing and implementing the final agreement, they also sought to protect traditional agency responsibilities. Too broad a grant of authority to the Tripartite Committee could limit their own ability to carry out statutorily mandated responsibilities to contract with, monitor and evaluate private sector service providers. In the final analysis, the state was still accountable for the uses to which SSBG funds were put.

Given these concerns, the state team went far to accommodate the private, non-profit team's position, but not so far as to allow the tripartite committee a determining voice in the selection and evaluation of service providers. The agreement reached between the state and private teams regarding the Tripartite Committee (the municipal team played a somewhat passive role in this issue) included implementation/oversight duties, responsibility for interpreting the terms of the agreements (in cases where language might prove unclear), determining the disposition of additions to or losses from the SSBG, the right to review and advise DHR and OPM with regard to such matters as training, planning and funding innovative projects, and data base development, the responsibility for overseeing the evaluation of the client-centered coordination of services, and preparing for future negotiations on the SSBG. Clearly, the Tripartite Committee, which was to be composed of three members from each of the sectors and a non-voting chair selected by the Governor, would have a considerable role to play in administering the SSBG.

Three remaining issues -- investment of grant funds, administrative costs and the timely payment of grant awards -- were, at the state team's request, left unresolved and referred to the Tripartite Committee for future action. Thus, even before the NIS was concluded, the new committee had an agenda.

In closing the working sessions of the NIS, each team took the floor to praise the others for their goodwill, cooperation and professionalism and to laud the NIS process as a "quantum leap" in intergovernmental relations.

All that remained was the formal signing of the agreement and for Governor O'Neill to carry out his commitment to submit the allocation plan produced by the three negotiating teams for legislative approval.

The responsibility for drafting the NIS agreement fell, understandably, to the mediator. Work on the written agreement had begun long before the negotiations were completed. On 28 October, prior to resolution of any of the most important substantive issues, the mediator circulated a document suggesting the format which the final agreement might take and which pulled together most of the various position papers submitted by the three teams. This initial document served to elicit feedback but, more importantly, it was intended to establish a positive tone for the important negotiations ahead. As important issues were resolved, this initial "draft agreement" was revised and circulated among the negotiating teams for comment. The last draft was circulated among the negotiating teams within a week of the last session, and the final draft was ready to go to the printer by 13 January.

V. Assessing the Process

A. Post-NIS Activities

As initially conceived, the Connecticut NIS was supposed to produce an end product - the FFY 1984 allocation plan for the SSBG. While it did accomplish this not inconsiderable task, the participants would undoubtedly characterize their major achievement as not the production of a budget but the initiation of a process. In this sense, it would be inaccurate to describe the end of Connecticut's NIS experiment. The close of formal joint negotiations marked only the closing of the first "stage" of the NIS. All of the participants have agreed that the most important and challenging work of the NIS lies ahead.

Nonetheless, Connecticut's NIS was conceived as a process having a beginning and an end. Regardless of what occurs in the months and years ahead, the NIS was a unique event, one worthy of study and celebration. Thus, two major events marked the weeks immediately following the last joint session: a formal signing ceremony and a final "iterative evaluation" (debriefing). (There was one other "iterative evaluation" midway through the negotiations. Its results are not reported here.)

At the signing ceremony, which was attended by about 200 people, including members and staff of the negotiating teams, a number of state agency heads, a delegation from the Kettering Foundation, a number of leading members of the State General Assembly and a press contingent, Governor O'Neill accepted the final agreement and promised to carry out his pledge to submit the allocation plan to the General Assembly for approval. Additionally, the Governor signed an executive order creating an SSBG Tripartite Committee, thus giving the committee the legal standing that the private, non-profit team had wanted.

The occasion of the ceremony also provided the opportunity for Kettering to conduct a final evaluation of Connecticut's NIS. The evaluation, called an iterative evaluation, took the form of a "debriefing" of the negotiating team spokespersons and the mediator. In addition to a structured question and answer session led by Kettering staff, the group was also presented with and asked to respond to a number of the conclusions and inferences drawn from the formal evaluation of the NIS conducted by the evaluation consultant.

Despite the tremendous good feeling all participants expressed toward the NIS process and toward the members of the other teams, a number of areas of dissatisfaction were identified by the team leaders, especially by the non-state members. A major criticism of the NIS process was that some participants did not feel that they had received a sufficient orientation. The training and explanatory materials provided by Kettering apparently did not convey either a "feel" for what an NIS was like or provide enough specific information about how to conduct one. One team suggested that, since NIS has now been tried a number of times, the term NIS "experiment" should be dropped and a greater attempt made to provide specific, normative guidance for future NIS negotiators.

On the substantive side, another criticism, again from the non-state team leaders, was the lack of detailed knowledge of how the state administered the SSBG program. Despite the vast amount of data provided by the state, the non-state teams apparently often did not understand the basis or motivation for some state proposals. Both non-state team leaders noted that additional training and information regarding the administration of the SSBG would have made them more effective negotiators. Both team leaders realistically admitted that the state, with its greater knowledge, experience and resources, dominated the NIS proceedings. They argued, however, that additional resources for staff would have helped create a more equal relationship, and that both the Tripartite Committee and any future NIS should be adequately staffed.

Finally, the mediator's role was discussed. In the initial draft of the formal evaluation, the evaluation consultant leveled a number of criticisms of the chief mediator. The consultant observed that the mediator had been too passive. Further, the consultant noted that the mediator appeared on occasion to have abdicated his role to the state team leader. Finally, the consultant criticized the mediator for occasionally failing to carry out his administrative duties efficiently. Minutes, he point out, were frequently not produced and distributed in time to be used for the next meeting (which made it difficult to keep track of details, such as what was agreed to and what remained to be resolved) and physical arrangements were often made late or were inadequate.

The leaders of all three teams took issue with most of these criticisms. While conceding that the mediator had played his role in a somewhat passive style, they pointed out that this was precisely the style they had desired. Few of the key participants wanted an active or aggressive mediator. Furthermore, few had apparently wanted a mediator who was particularly expert in the field of human services. Being

experts themselves, the negotiators stated that they would have been affronted by any attempt by the mediator to push a particular point of view. Finally, they pointed out that the mediator had played a major and constructive role in building a consensus, but that he had largely played that role outside of the public sessions. There was agreement, however, that the mediator had not performed his administrative duties well. All agreed that assigning the mediator responsibilities for administration was probably a mistake and that other arrangements should be made in any future NIS.

B. Conclusion

In the sense alluded to above, attempting a conclusion here may be inappropriate. Connecticut's NIS produced not so much an end product as a process for effecting orderly and rational change. The new cooperative working relationship created during the negotiations and codified by the Governor's executive order establishing an NIS Tripartite Committee virtually assure such a process. Assessment of both the impact of the final agreement and the process it initiated must, however, await further action by the General Assembly, completion of the formal evaluation and time for reflection.

Still, this can certainly be said of Connecticut's NIS experiment: While none of the participants would claim that all, or even most, of the decisions made during the negotiations were necessarily the best or most reasoned decisions, a majority of them would no doubt argue that they were better decisions than had been made (or not made) in the past, and that at least the representatives of those affected by the decisions had a voice in making them.

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APPENDIX I
TABLE OF MEETINGS/EVENTS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>MUNICIPAL</u>	<u>PRIVATE/NONPROFIT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
November 1981	19-OPM/Kettering 25-OPM/Governor's Task Force			NIS Design
December	15-OPM/Kettering 23-OPM/Kettering			NIS Design
January 1982	OPM/Kettering Letter of Understanding			NIS Design
February	OPM informs State agencies/municipalities of NIS			NIS DESIGN
March				NIS Design
May	3-4-OPM/Kettering briefing for State/municipalities			Briefings - NIS Design
June	3-OPM/State agency managers 18-Mediator interviews	18-Mediator Interviews	4-Briefing 18-Mediator interviews	Briefings Mediator selection
July	28-OPM/Kettering/ Mediator	28-CCM/COST/Mediator	1-Steering Committee Selection 8-Steering Committee 14-Steering Committee Negotiating Team Selection 29-Steering Committee/mediator	NIS Design Team Selection
August	11-Full Team Selection/ Mediator 13-Full Team 20 Full Team/Mediator 24-OPM/DHR 25-OPM/DHR 27-OPM/DHR	15-CCM/COST/ 16-Formed negotiating team	4-Team/Steering Committee/Mediator	Team Selection NIS Design HHS Grant Application RFP-Evaluation Consultant
September	2-Full team/Mediator 3-Full Team 10-OPM/DHR 20-Ground rules session 22 State Team/Mediator 23-All Negotiation teams/ Mediator	15-Advisory/Committee/Negotiating Team 20-Ground rules ses- 23-Neg.teams/media- tor 24-Advisory Commit- tee/negotiating team 29-Negotiating team	8-Steering Committee/Mediator 9-Negotiating team/Mediator 16-Negotiating team 17- Negotiating team 19-Negotiating team 20-Ground rules session 22-Steering Committee 23-Neg. teams/Media- tor 28-Steering Commit- tee/Mediator 30-Steering Commit- tee	Ground rules/guiding principles Team orientation Ground rules session Data Base construc- tion

Appendix I .continued.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>MUNICIPAL</u>	<u>PRIVATE, NONPROFIT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
October	1-OPM/DHR 7-full team/mediator 12-1st joint session 19-OPM/legislative briefing 21-Negotiating team 25-Negotiating team 29-Full team/Mediator	12-1st joint session 25-Advisory Committee/negotiating team	5-Negotiating team 8-Negotiating team/Mediator 9-Negotiating team 12-1st joint session 14-Steering Committee 18-Public workshop 19-Legislative Briefing 21-Negotiating team 26-Negotiating team 27-Steering Committee/Mediator	1st joint session - Issues to be addressed in final agreement - Guiding principles
November	3-4-2nd joint session 8-Negotiating team 12-OPM/DHR 16-OPM/DHR 17-OPM/DHR 18-Negotiating team 23-3rd joint session 29-Negotiating team	3-4-2nd joint session 18-Advisory Committee/negotiating team 23-3rd joint session	1-Negotiating team 3-4-2nd joint session 5-Steering Committee 19-Negotiating team 23-3rd joint session 29-Negotiating team	2nd joint session -Service definitions priorities -Criteria to evaluating/selecting service providers 3rd joint session -Service priorities -Criteria for evaluating/selecting service priorities
December	2-Negotiating team 3-Negotiating team 6-7 4th joint session 16-Negotiating team 23-5th joint session 29-Legislative briefing	6-7-4th joint session 23-5th joint session	1-Steering Committee 3-Negotiating team 5-Negotiating team 6-7 4th joint session 15-Negotiating team 19-Negotiating team 23-5th joint session 28-Legislative briefing	4th joint session - Allocations - Tripartite Committee - Criteria for evaluation and selection of service provider 5th joint session - Tripartite Committee - Criteria for evaluation and selection of service providers
January 1983	12-Negotiating team 25-Signing	25-Signing	11-Negotiating team 13-Negotiating team 25-Signing	Signing ceremonies

APPENDIX II

SERVICE PRIORITIES FOR SSBG FUNDS

STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. Service priorities shall be based on social service needs.
2. Criteria utilized for identifying and ranking social service needs shall be explicit.
3. Adverse impacts on service recipients should be minimized.

RESOLUTION II-1

In order to establish the priorities among the SSBG-supported services, the following criteria are adopted as indicators of service importance. The specific question or questions accompanying the statement of each criterion identifies the way in which each criterion is used to measure or evaluate service importance. The criteria are:

Abuse curtailment

Does the service provide intervention and/or shelter from physical or sexual abuse?

Emergency intervention

Does the service provide intervention in acute, emergency and potentially life-threatening situations requiring immediate action?

Avoids/prevents greater expenditures for service

Does the provision of this service prevent or delay the provision of more expensive services? If this service were not available, would the needs of the recipient require State expenditures for higher, (i.e., more expensive) levels of service, such as hospitalization, nursing home care and/or other types of institutionalization?

Human Services Annual Agenda

Does the service address one or more of the categories delineated in the 1983-84 Human Services Annual Agenda (Connecticut General Statutes Sections 4-85b and 4-85c)?

Prevent inappropriate institutionalization

Does the service provide a humane, appropriate and cost-effective alternative to institutionalization?

Reduce dependency

Does the provision of this service reduce the dependency on institutional support services, thereby increasing one's self-sufficiency?

RESOLUTION II-2

Social services, as defined in Section I of this Agreement, are divided into three priority groupings. In addition to identifying service priorities based upon social service needs, these three priority groupings also outline the general principles on which allocation formulas are predicated. Those principles are defined as follows:

High Priority Services

Services within this category shall be eligible for a cost-of-living adjustment or a cost-of-living adjustment plus additional financial allocations. Those high priority services for which funding is not being currently provided shall be financially supported at a level commensurate with their status as high priority services.

Medium Priority Services

Services within this category shall remain at their present level of funding or remain at their present level and receive a cost-of-living adjustment.

Low Priority Services

Services within this category shall remain at their present level of funding or receive a decrease in funding.

RESOLUTION II-3

Utilizing the service definitions contained in Resolution I-1 of this Agreement and the principles contained in Resolution II-1 and Resolution II-2, the service priorities are:

High Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)

- Adoption services
- Child day care services
- Client-oriented coordination of services
- Community-based non-residential services
- Community-based residential services
- Day treatment services
- Emergency shelter services
- Safeguarding or protective services

Medium Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)

- Employability services
- Family planning services
- Foster family care services

Medium Priority Services (continued)

Home management - maintenance services⁴
Legal services⁴

Low Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)

Counseling⁴
Information and referral⁵
Recreation
Residential treatment services
Transportation services

⁴ To the extent these services are part of a service with a higher priority ranking, they would retain the priority of that other higher-ranking service.

⁵ It was agreed to study this service category to see if a unitary statewide system can be established.

ALLOCATION MECHANISMS

STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. Mechanisms shall be developed for allocating to social service needs and providers the full amount of SSBG funds available each federal fiscal year. Specific allocations shall be identified by budget category (service categories, set-asides, etc.)
2. Innovative programming efforts shall be encouraged. Whenever appropriate, funding shall be available on a competitive basis for service delivery or management innovations.
3. SSBG funds shall be used to support those services as agreed to in the NIS process and in accordance with federal and state law. SSBG dollars shall directly support human services and shall not supplant general funds within any agency except in accordance with the agreement reached in the NIS process. SSBG funds shall be accounted for under generally accepted accounting principles.

RESOLUTION III-1

There shall be no transfer of SSBG dollars to other block grants.

RESOLUTION III-2

A specific set-aside of money shall be available on a competitive basis for service delivery or management innovations. The Tripartite Social Services Block Grant Committee established pursuant to this process shall review such innovative applications and programs.

RESOLUTION III-3

Funding shall be based on (a) priority needs for social services, (b) service providers' performance in meeting such needs and (c) cost-efficiency in service delivery.

RESOLUTION III-4

Allocations of SSBG funds in federal fiscal year 1984 shall be made in accordance with the attached allocation schedule and its accompanying explanation, with the provision that "medium priority services" identified in Resolution II-2 shall be eligible to receive, on a competitive basis, a cost-of-living increase not to exceed 5.8 percent.

SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS FOR FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 1984

A SERVICE/AGENCY OR PROGRAM COORDINATE	B FEDERAL FY 1983 ALLOCATION	C CHANGES TO ACCOMPLISH SWP	D ALLOCATION AFTER SWP	E CHANGES TO REORDER PER DEFINITIONS	F ALLOCATION AFTER SWP & REORDERING	G REALLOCATIONS	H PROPOSED FY 1984 ALLOCATIONS
						H	
1 HIGH PRIORITY SERVICES							
2 Adoption	0	0	0	0	0	+20,000	20,000
3 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	0	0	0	0	0	+20,000	20,000
4 Child Day Care	9,815,115	+601,832	10,616,967	0	10,616,967	0	10,616,967
5 Dept. of Human Resources	9,815,115	+601,832	10,616,967	0	10,616,967	0	10,616,967
6 Client-Oriented Coordination	0	0	0	0	0	+500,000	500,000
7 Dept. to be determined	0	0	0	0	0	+500,000	500,000
8 Community Based Non-Residential	1,562,401	+107,436	1,669,837	+989,339	2,657,476	+400,000	3,079,476
9 Dept. of Human Resources	142,349	0	142,349	+912,000	1,114,349	0	1,114,349
10 Dept. on Aging	1,560,022	+187,436	1,547,488	0	1,547,488	+360,000	1,907,488
11 Bird. of Ed. & Services for Blind	0	0	0	+17,639	17,639	+40,000	57,639
12 Community Based Residential	319,065	+663,371	982,436	+612,071	1,594,457	0	1,594,457
13 Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission	162,390	+819,846	982,436	+612,021	1,594,457	0	1,594,457
14 Dept. of Correction	156,475	-156,457	0	0	0	0	0
15 Day Treatment	2,416,721	+1,330,281	3,747,002	0	3,747,002	+260,000	4,007,002
16 Dept. of Human Resources	6,394	+1,330,281	6,094	0	6,094	+200,000	3,900,000
17 Dept. of Mental Retardation	2,410,627	0	3,740,900	0	3,740,900	+60,000	60,000
18 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	0	0	0	0	0		
19 Emergency Shelters	694,000	+67,477	961,477	+51,800	1,013,277	+251,066	1,264,343
20 Dept. of Human Resources	210,000	+67,477	277,477	0	277,477	0	277,477
21 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	604,000	0	684,000	0	684,000	0	684,000
22 Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission	0	0	0	+51,800	51,800	0	51,800
23 Agency to be Determined	0	0	0	0	0	+251,066	251,066
24 Safeguarding	1,245,027	-170,508	1,074,519	+366,136	1,440,655	+100,000	1,540,655
25 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	445,302	0	445,302	0	445,302	0	445,302
26 Human Rights & Opportunities	170,508	-170,500	0	0	0	0	0
27 Dept. of Human Resources	578,422	0	578,422	+100,000	666,422	0	666,422
28 Protection & Advocacy - Handicapped	90,795	0	50,795	+13,300	63,995	0	63,995
29 Commission on the Deaf	0	0	0	+264,936	264,936	0	264,936
30 Agency to be Determined	0	0	0	0	0	+100,000	100,000
31 SUBTOTAL - HIGH PRIORITIES	16,192,329	+2,879,909	19,072,238	+2,019,596	21,091,834	+1,531,066	22,622,800
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6 See note on line 127.

A SERVICE/AGENCY OF PROGRAM COORDINANCE	B FEDERAL FY 1983 ALLOCATION	C CHANGES TO ALLOCATION ACCOMPLISH SNAP	D ALLOCATION AFTER SNAP	E CHANGES TO REORDER PER DEFINITIONS	F ALLOCATION AFTER SNAP REORDERING	G REALLOCATIONS	H PROPOSED FY 1984 ALLOCATIONS
30 MEDIUM PRIORITIES							
31	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196
32 Employability	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196
33 Peopl. of Human Resources	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196	0	1,081,196
34 Family Planning	1,132,701	0	1,132,701	0	1,132,701	0	1,132,701
35 Dept. of Human Resources	1,132,701	0	1,132,701	0	1,132,701	0	1,132,701
36 Foster Care	0	0	0	0	0	0	120,000
41 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	0	0	0	0	0	0	120,000
42 Home Management?	1,181,322	0	1,181,322	-1,000,000	103,322	0	103,322
43 Dept. of Human Resources	1,181,322	0	1,181,322	-1,000,000	103,322	0	103,322
44 Legal Services?	2,021,895	-1,023,047	1,008,848	0	1,008,848	0	1,008,848
45 Dept. of Human Resources	980,276	0	980,276	0	980,276	0	980,276
46 Protection & Advocacy - Handicapped Public Defender	28,572	0	28,572	0	28,572	0	28,572
47	1,023,047	-1,023,047	0	0	0	0	0
48 Cost of Living Reserve (5.8 %) ⁸						192,912	192,912
49 MEDIUM PRIORITY SUBTOTAL	5,429,116	-1,023,047	4,406,069	-1,000,000	3,326,089	3,326,089	3,638,901
50 LHM PRIORITIES							
51 Counselling?	4,847,434	-2,138,427	2,509,007	-586,795	1,922,232	-100,000	1,822,212
52 Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission	640,795	0	640,795	-586,795	54,000	0	54,000
53 Dept. of Consumer Protection	86,234	-86,234	0	0	0	0	0
54 Dept. of Correction	821,495	-821,495	0	0	0	0	0
55 Judicial Dept.	1,430,698	-1,430,698	0	0	0	0	0
56 Dept. of Human Resources	1,868,212	0	1,868,212	0	1,868,212	-100,000	1,768,212
57 Info and Referral	2,157,912	-113,672	2,044,240	-352,801	1,691,439	-900,000	891,439
58							
59 Dept. of Human Resources	1,602,183	0	1,602,183	0	1,602,183	-76,000	802,183
60 Alcohol & Drug Abuse Commission	153,026	0	153,026	-77,026	0	-800,000	0
61 Brd. of Ed. & Services for Blind	17,639	0	17,639	-17,639	0	0	0
62 Commission on the deaf	244,926	0	244,926	-244,926	0	0	0
63 Protection & Advocacy - Handicapped Human Rights & Opportunities	26,456	0	26,456	-13,200	13,200	0	13,200
64	113,672	-113,672	0	0	0	0	0
65 Recreation	660,075	0	660,075	0	660,075	-120,000	320,075
66							
67 Dept. of Human Resources	660,075	0	660,075	0	660,075	-330,000	330,075
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⁷ Counselling, home management-maintenance and legal services which are part of another service rather than freestanding are ranked with the services of which they are a part.

⁸ A cost of living increase will be considered upon an individual review of each service provider.

A SERVICE/AGENCY OF PROGRAM CONCERN	B FEDERAL FY 1983 ALLOCATION	C CHANGES TO ALLOCATION ACCOMPLISHED SINCE SNAP	D CHANGES TO REBUDGET PER DEFINITIONS & RENUMBERING	E ALLOCATION AFTER SNAP	F RELOCATIONS FY 1984	G PREVIOUS FY 1984 ALLOCATIONS
101 LOW PRIORITIES (continued)						
102 Residential Treatment	2,302,730	0	2,302,730	0	2,302,730	0
103 Dept. of Children & Youth Services	2,302,730	0	2,302,730	0	2,302,730	0
105 Transportation	196,764	0	196,764	0	196,764	-196,764
106 Dept. of Human Resources	196,764	0	196,764	0	196,764	0
111 LOW PRIORITY SUBTOTAL	10,164,915	-2,452,099	7,712,816	-939,596	6,773,220	-1,426,764
112 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	5,346,456
113 SET-ASIDES	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
114 Training Innovative Projects	850,069	0	850,069	0	850,069	-250,069
116 Data Base, Strategic Planning, Contingencies	0	0	0	0	0	+380,000
117 Evaluation & Technical Ass't.	0	0	0	0	0	+138,488
119 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	138,488
120 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
121 SET-ASIDES SUBTOTAL	850,069	0	850,069	0	850,069	+510,419
122 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1,368,488
123 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION	496,456	-312,396	164,060	0	164,060	0
124 Dept. of Human Resources	164,060	0	164,060	0	164,060	0
125 Office of Policy & Management	332,396	-312,396	0	0	0	164,060
126 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	0
127 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
128 BALANCE FOR REALLOCATION	0	927,633	927,633	0	927,633	-927,633
129 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	0
130 TOTAL	33,140,885	0	33,140,885	0	33,140,885	0
131 -----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
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⁹ There is potentially another \$86,928 as listed in the 11/26/82 Federal Register. This, plus any carryover funding, will be apportioned as follows: First, the contingency fund will be restored to 1 percent of the present block grant total (\$331,400). Second, an additional \$750,000 will be reserved for Client-Oriented Coordination of Services and will be released for that purpose after six months experience with the service in the fiscal year and a tripartite evaluation. Third, \$125,000 will be reserved for Transportation. Any additional funding will be allocated through a tripartite agreement.

EXPLANATION OF ALLOCATION SCHEDULE

I. DESCRIPTION OF COLUMNS ON THE ALLOCATION SCHEDULE

- A. Column A lists the service categories and the State agencies of program cognizance under each. The services are grouped according to the agreed-upon priority rankings.
- B. Column B shows the SSBG allocation for the current fiscal year based upon the service definitions in effect prior to the negotiations.
- C. Column C reflects all of the pluses and minuses in SSBG funding necessary to accomplish the swap of SSBG and General Fund money. The swap was negotiated in order to permit agencies and important services not directly related to the statutory Block Grant goals to withdraw from the Block Grant. Those services affected as a result of the agencies' withdrawal are: Community Based Residential (Department of Correction - line 24), Safeguarding (Human Rights and Opportunities - line 42), Legal Services (Public Defender - line 85), Counseling (Consumer Protection, Correction, Judicial - lines 83 to 85), Information and Referral (Human Rights and Opportunities - line 95), Administration (OPM - line 126).

The services and agencies which contributed General Fund dollars and are to receive SSBG dollars in their place are: Child Day Care (Department of Human Resources - line 9), Community Based Non-Residential (Department on Aging - line 18), Community Based Residential (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission - line 23), Day Treatment (Department of Mental Retardation - line 29) and Emergency Shelter (Department of Human Resources - line 34).

- D. Column D is the total of column B plus column C. It is an intermediate step which shows the allocation after the swap. All other allocations remain the same. In each instance, swap dollars were placed in high priority services.
- E. Column E reflects changes in classification of existing services to reflect the newly negotiated service definitions. For example, it is agreed that counseling, home management-maintenance services and legal services which are part of another service rather than free standing will be classified with the service of which they are a part. Each plus indicates an activity moved from somewhere else in the column. Each minus indicates an activity moved to another classification. There is no net change in funding in the column; each plus is balanced by a minus. The changes include:
 - 1. Movement of \$972,000 from DHR - Home Management (line 66) to Community Based Non-Residential (line 17).
 - 2. Movement of \$17,639 from the Board of Education and Services for the Blind - Information & Referral (line 92) to Community Based Non-Residential (line 19).
 - 3. Movement of \$534,995 CADAC - Counseling (line 82) and \$77,026 CADAC - Information & Referral (line 91) to CADAC - Community Based Residential (line 23).
 - 4. Movement of \$51,800 from CADAC - Counseling (line 82) to CADAC - Emergency Shelter (line 36).

5. Movement of \$108,000 from DHR - Home Management (line 66) to DHR - Safeguarding (line 43).
6. Movement of \$13,200 from Protection and Advocacy - Information & Referral (line 94) to Protection and Advocacy - Safeguarding (line 44).
7. Movement of \$244,036 from Deaf and Hearing Impaired - Information and Referral (line 93) to Deaf and Hearing Impaired - Safeguarding (line 45).

F. Column F summarizes the net effect of the swap changes and the definitional changes.

G. Column G presents all of the negotiated reallocations of funding. The minuses are program reductions and the pluses are program increases. The reductions are as follows:

1. The \$927,613 balance available for reallocation in Column F (line 128)
2. Transportation - Department of Human Resources (line 109) - \$196,764
3. Counseling - Department of Human Resources (line 36) - \$100,000
4. Information and Referral - Department of Human Resources (line 90) - \$800,000
5. Recreation - Department of Human Resources (line 99) - \$330,000
6. Training (line 115) - \$258,069

The increases are:

1. Adoption - \$20,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 5)
2. Client-Oriented Coordination of Services - \$500,000 - agency to be determined (line 13)
3. Community Based Non-Residential - \$400,000, including \$360,000 through the Department on Aging (line 18) and \$40,000 for the Board of Education and Services for the Blind (line 19)
4. Day Treatment - \$200,000 - Department of Mental Retardation (line 29); \$60,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 30)
5. Emergency Shelter - \$251,066 - agency to be determined (line 37)
6. Safeguarding - \$100,000 - agency to be determined (line 46)
7. Foster Care - \$120,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 62)

It is also agreed that funds will be set aside for the following purposes:

1. Innovative Projects - \$250,000 (line 116)
2. Data Base, Strategic Planning and Evaluation - \$380,000 (line 117)
3. Contingencies - \$138,488 (line 119)

A reserve is set aside (line 74) for cost of living increases in medium priority programs. Eligibility for increases will be determined based upon a review of each provider. Any leftover money will revert to the Contingency Fund (line 119).

The total amount allocated is \$33,140,885, the same amount available in the current year. Data published in the Federal Register on November 26, 1982 indicated that an additional \$836,998 may be available in FY 1984, if appropriated by Congress. It is agreed that this sum, plus any carryover funding, will be allocated as follows: First, the Contingency Fund would be restored to \$331,400 (1 percent of the present block grant total). Second, an additional \$250,000 will be reserved for Client-Oriented Coordination of Services and will be released for that purpose after six months' experience with that service and a review by the Tripartite SSBG Committee. Third, \$125,000 will be reserved for Transportation. Any additional funding would be allocated by the Tripartite Committee.

II. DESCRIPTION OF SET ASIDES

A. Training (line 115)

The teams agree to set aside \$600,000 in training dollars. This money would be administered by the Department of Human Resources, with planning by a committee of involved agencies in order to preserve the integrity and provision of generic training of staff and service providers.

B. Innovative Projects (line 116)

There shall be a set aside of \$250,000 for the purpose of encouraging and entertaining new and innovative requests for proposals (RFP's) which fall under the purview of priorities established under the Social Services Block Grant. RFP's will be reviewed pursuant to the procedures established in Section V of this Agreement.

C. Data Base, Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (line 117)

The teams agree to set aside \$380,000 for the tripartite development of an automated human service data base/management information system, for strategic planning related to the SSBG, for evaluation, and for technical assistance to SSBG service providers.

The maintenance of this data base and the coordination of the programmatic and fiscal data will rest with OPM and DHR. The State will develop the planning and evaluation of data into an overall management information system which will strive for computer compatibility throughout the State, initially among grantor and service provider agencies with automated capacity. It will develop these systems and the necessary tools for implementation of the system (manuals, forms, etc.). The initial objective will be an expanded capacity to develop and maintain common service definitions, fiscal allocations, client characteristics, and related types of data. The goal will be to provide a common source of reliable data and to assist the Tripartite Social Services Block Grant Committee in timely policy, management and fiscal allocation decisions.

In the area of evaluation, the teams agree to hire a consultant to review current State grant administration requirements, including audit, reporting

and evaluating requirements and to offer recommendations to simplify and reduce administrative burdens on all service providers.

D. Contingency Fund (line 119)

The teams agree to set aside \$138,488 (plus other funding which may become available as described in the final paragraph of Part I, above). The fund will be available for activities that are liable to occur during the year but cannot be fully anticipated in advance of the start of the program year.

Contingency uses would be limited to:

1. Funding new, unanticipated priority programs
2. Meeting unanticipated emergency program situations and needs (e.g., flood, etc.)
3. Funding unanticipated time-limited activities: studies, consultants, etc., which will enhance SSBG management and/or service delivery.

III. STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

A. SSBG Lead Agency: Department of Human Resources

Working with OPM, the Lead Agency has central responsibility for:

1. Liaison with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2. Executing letters of agreement with the State agencies of cognizance for the funds allocated by SSBG service definitions
3. Coordinating ongoing data base, grant administration reform, needs assessments and other ongoing planning and administrative functions
4. Maintaining appropriate audit records (State/federal)
5. Liaison with the General Assembly
6. Providing technical assistance to State agencies of cognizance and other service providers.

B. State Agencies of Program Cognizance

Identified State agencies of cognizance¹⁰, in coordination with OPM and the lead agency, shall have responsibility for:

1. Reviewing current and potential service providers, utilizing the accepted Criteria For Evaluation and Selection of Service Providers as agreed in Section IV of this Agreement.
2. Executing contracts or letters of agreement with service providers

¹⁰ State Agencies of Cognizance include: DHR, DMR, DCYS, DMH, CADAC, SDA, Board of Education and Services for the Blind, Commission on the Deaf and Hearing Impaired, and Office of Protection and Advocacy.

3. Monitoring programs
4. Maintaining appropriate audit records for provider contracts
5. Performing impact assessments
6. Participating in ongoing data base, grant administration reform, needs assessments and other planning and administrative functions

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Unclassified

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February, 1984

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